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ABSTRACT
THE FOUNDING OF THE ART IN EMBASSIES PROGRAM AND THE
MISREPRESENTATION OF AMERICAN ART
Zachary Scott Distel
April 26, 2013
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s New York’s Museum of Modern Art commodified the
paintings of Abstract Expressionist artists. By commodifying the artwork, the Museum of
Modern Art could then present it as a product of American capitalism thereby making it a
powerful diplomatic tool for Cold War diplomacy. This was achieved through the
Museum of Modern Art’s curatorial decisions, exhibitions, covert dealings by the
Museum’s leadership, and formalist analysis during the period. Formalist analysis is
focused on aestheticizing works of art. The State Department’s Art in Embassies Program
was directly influenced by the Museum of Modern Art and practiced the same
commodification in its curatorial practices for exhibiting not only Abstract Expressionist
but also Pop art. This curatorial practice undermined the anti-capitalist goals of both
Abstract Expressionism and Pop Art.
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INTRODUCTION

This thesis explores the invention of the term Abstract Expressionism by New
York’s Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) in the context of United States international
diplomacy during the 1950s. My inquiry is centered on MoMA’s pivotal influence on the
development of curatorial practices of the Art in Embassy Program (AIEP) under its first
director, Nancy Kefauver. Organized by the U.S. Department of State in 1964, the AIEP
still places original works of American art in diplomatic offices and residences abroad.
By theorizing the movement as a direct outcome of a capitalist democracy, MoMA
established Abstract Expressionism as a powerful diplomatic tool. Johnathan Harris
writes, “the institutional enshrinement of Abstract Expressionism…culminated in the
Museum of Modern Art’s show The New American Painting, which toured eight
European capitals in 1958 and 1959.”1 This popular notion of Abstract Expressionism
was asserted through exhibitions, clandestine dealings by MoMA’s leadership, and
formalist analysis of the artwork.

1

Johnathan Harris, “Modernism and the Culture in the USA, 1930-1960,” in Modern Art Practices and
Debates: Practices and Debates, Paul Wood et al (New Haven: Yale University Perss, 1993), 62-3. See
Appendix 1 for a list of artists included in the exhibition. In the catalog accompanying the exhibition,
Alfred H. Barr argued that: “Abstract Expressionism, a phrase used ephemerally in Berlin in 1919, was reinvented (by the writer) about 1929 to designate Kandinsky’s early abstractions that in certain ways do
anticipate the American movement—to which the term was first applied in 1946.” Here, Barr takes credit
for inventing the concept of Abstract Expressionism. Alfred H. Barr, “Introduction,” The New American
Painting: As Shown in eight European countries 1958-1959 (New York: The Museum of Modern Art,
1959), 16.

1

MoMA’s approach to Abstract Expressionism is revealed in its treatment of
paintings by Jackson Pollock, Robert Motherwell, Mark Rothko, Willem de Kooning,
and others as commodities. The historical triumph of consumerism, which is evident in
the commodification that MoMA proposed in its exhibitions in the 1950s, was organized
to parallel the diplomatic agendas of the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations,
irrespective of Congressional and official government opinion of the artwork. Paul
Wood defines a commodity as “something which is exchanged in the market for money
or other commodities”:
It is usually manufactured or subject to some kind of productive labor or singling out and
is produced for exchange before its ultimate consumption. Production for private
consumption is not commodity production; “commodity” is the term given to products
when the process of production is centered upon market exchange. 2

An important distinction between a commodity and, for example, a good is that the
former is not produced for immediate or “private consumption,” but is intended to be
traded in the market. A commodity’s value is predicated largely on its exchange value on
a commodities market.
The American avant-garde of the mid-twentieth century critically engaged or
disengaged with commodified society. Wood notes that “modern art has been
fundamentally and doubly marked by commodification”:
On the one hand this marking extends from the depiction by artists of a world of
commodities to more diffuse forms of meaning expressive of the effects of
commodification…On the other hand the productive system of art in the modern period
itself became commodified. This is an important matter since its effect is implicitly to
challenge the modernist work of art at its root, insofar as its actual condition as
commodity within a productive system, an economy, stands at odds with its rhetorical
condition as autonomous, pure, or free.3

2

Paul Wood, “Commodity,” in Critical Terms for Art History, ed. Robert S Nelson and Richard Shiff
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 383-4.
3
Wood, “Commodity,” 382.

2

When MoMA commodified Abstract Expressionist paintings it negated their purported
independence from the market as “modernist work[s] of art” as well as the artists struggle
to be “autonomous, pure, or free” from American capitalism. In its later curatorial
decisions, the AIEP continued this process by commodifying Pop art, too, neglecting to
recognize its direct engagement and critique of the denigration of art as mere objects of
exchange values. Wood describes the fundamental difference:
The principal ideological underpinning of the concept of expression in art had been the
claim for its ‘directness’ as distinct from the mediations and conventions of commodified
modernity. Always philosophically questionable in principle, this claim was now
exhausted in practice. The commodity had, so to speak, triumphed again.
With authentic expression reduced to cliché such truth as was available had now
to be won not merely from but through the jungle of commodities. The strategy that
emerged from this in the late 1950s and 1960s was one of citation, born of the perception
of a distinction akin to that made in philosophy between ‘use’ and ‘mention.’ 4

The artists characterized as Abstract Expressionists rejected and withdrew from
commodified society while Pop artists utilized the symbols and products of commodities
in their artwork. By the end of the 1950s, Abstract Expressionist painting had become a
systematic, clichéd method, forcing young avant-garde artists to seek new modes of
expression. Rather than trying to isolate themselves from commodification, Pop artists
engaged with it in a critical manner.
In the AIEP’s curatorial decisions, Abstract Expressionism and Pop art appeared
as unvaried parts of the same Cold War consumer culture. The 1959 American National
Exhibition in Moscow was dominated by a utopian, consumerist vision of capitalist
culture. Vice President Richard Nixon lauded the prowess of American capitalist society
to Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev in what would come to be known as the “Kitchen
Debate.” With the two leaders sparing over the merits and superiority of their respective

4

Wood, “Commodity,” 401.
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society’s way of life, it was a contest of capitalist and communist ideologies. Speaking to
Khrushchev, Nixon declared:
To us, the right to choose…is the most important thing. We don’t have one decision
made at the top by one government official….We have many different manufacturers and
many different kinds of washing machines so that the housewives have a choice….Would
it not be better to compete in the relative merits of washing machines than in the strength
of rockets?5

Consumption was at the heart of the American identity of the 1950s and 1960s.
MoMA’s establishment of Abstract Expressionism as a commodity and the
AIEP’s application of that theory to Pop art rendered the artwork as another product akin
to washing machines within the context of American capitalism. Historian Elaine Tyler
May defines the American postwar ideology as “successful breadwinners supporting
attractive homemakers in affluent suburban homes.”6 A “good” American was a prolific
consumer of products. Thus, Nixon used American products from cleaning supplies to
refrigerators as the manifest evidence of his society’s superiority. Simultaneously,
MoMA exhibited Abstract Expressionist works as commodities evidencing the
superiority of American capitalist society. Examination of the AIEP’s curatorial choices
and interpretive text demonstrates how it adopted this theory for exhibiting Abstract
Expressionism as well as Pop art.

5

Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York: Basic Books,
2008), 20.
6
May, Homeward Bound, 21.
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THE ART IN EMBASSIES PROGRAM: FROM MOMA TO THE STATE
DEPARTMENT

Although the United States’ history spans more than two centuries, its
participation in utilizing art for diplomacy is still young. Only in the last half-century has
the U.S. government officially supported exhibiting American art in embassies and
consulates. The first federal program in support of the arts did not occur until the New
Deal, which created several public art programs such as designing graphic art for
publications, training draftsmen for industrial sketches, and decorating public buildings
such as post offices. In comparison to other Western powers in the middle of the
twentieth century, the U.S. government was far behind in its efforts to support the arts at
home and especially abroad. In this policy vacuum, instead of the government, private
initiatives took up the task of promoting American art abroad.
Not only did the U.S. government fail to promote the arts, it was unusual in that it
did not begin a nationally owned art collection until the 1940s. Countries such as England
and France have vast networks of national art museums filled with collections spanning
multiple millennia. These collections were drawn upon to decorate foreign office. In
comparison, U.S. diplomats had no national collection from which to draw artwork.7
While the Smithsonian had been in existence for over a century and the National Gallery
7

Douglas McCreary Greenwood, Art In Embassies: Twenty-Five Years at the U.S. Department of State
1964-1989 (Washington D.C.: Friends of Art and Preservation in Embassies, 1989): 17.

5

of Art opened in 1941, their collections were not numerous enough for mass lending to
diplomatic buildings such as their European counterparts. The vast majority of art in the
U.S. was, and is, held in private, non-profit collections. This would have rendered the
search for, organizing, and processing of loans to embassies or consulates much more
cumbersome and time consuming.8 This was especially true because each loan from a
different institution means a different loan agreement and stipulations on the duration and
nuances of the loan. In spite of these difficulties, there was still a desire within the U.S.
government to utilize art for diplomacy.
Nelson Rockefeller served as a primary generator of the use of art for diplomacy.9
The first American use of art diplomacy was a series of exhibits organized by Rockefeller
that went to Latin America during WWII to counter Nazi influence there. He did this
during his first appointment to a federal position—Coordinator for Inter-American
Affairs—under President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The AIEP considers its earliest roots in
this office and Rockefeller’s efforts.10 The quantity of exhibitions was not prolific, but
this was not as significant as the fact they took place; Rockefeller established the U.S.
initiative for art diplomacy.
While the U.S. government did not directly support the arts for the majority of the
twentieth century, there was one other early foray into using art diplomacy in a State
Department sponsored exhibition. In the summer of 1946 the State Department purchased
79 oil paintings for a total price of $49,000 from a group of leading modern artists
including Georgia O’Keefe, Yasuo Kuniyoshi, Jack Levine, and Ben Shahn. A State
8

Because U.S. diplomats did not have a single, government owned collection to draw upon, a separate loan
contract would have been required for each loaning institution.
9
Richard T. Arndt, The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century
(Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2005): 363.
10
Greenwood, Art in Embassies, 19.
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Department official explained this unique purchase: “The United States has demonstrated
its superb ability to manufacture tanks, airplanes, guns, and all the other implements of
war…The United States must demonstrate that it also has an interest in and a vigorous
movement in the fields of art, music, and allied fields.”11 There was also a more subtle
rationale for supporting this exhibition. According to Assistant Secretary of State for
Public Affairs William Benton, “Exhibitions of this kind also make an impact among
Communists overseas because they illustrate the freedom with which and in which our
American artists work.”12 The initiative was dubbed Advancing American Art and after a
successful trial exhibition in New York, the collection was divided with one selection
going to Europe and the other to Latin America. Each exhibition was successful as it
traveled from city to city. In Prague, for example, the exhibit was so successful that the
Soviet’s organized a counter-exhibition but it failed miserably, only adding to the success
of the U.S.’s. But while the exhibitions enjoyed acclaim abroad, criticism mounted within
the U.S.13
Advancing American Art was cancelled following an outcry of criticism from
Congress and President Truman as well as some private citizens. In a private letter sent
April 2, 1947, President Truman expressed his distaste for Advancing American Art and
modern art in general because much of it was not representational.14 The basis for further
criticism of the exhibition was that it was a waste of tax dollars on “nonsensical ‘modern
art,’” that the art was of poor quality and taste and did not represent America, and, more
significantly, that the artists were suspected of “communistic ‘backgrounds’ or
11

Michael L. Krenn, Fall-Out Shelters For The Human Spirit: American Art and the Cold War (Chapel
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005): 28.
12
Krenn, Fall-Out Shelters, 27.
13
Krenn, Fall-Out Shelters, 35.
14
Krenn, Fall-Out Shelters, 43.
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‘affiliations.’”15 One of the paintings exhibited was Ben Shahn’s The Clinic, 1941. Shahn
was born in Lithuania creating a blatant link to communism for critics to attack. His
painting condemned him further because it depicts two working class women in a
prenatal doctor’s waiting room where a sign hangs which pictures Christ and the caption:
“Do I deserve prenatal care[?]” The painting calls attention to a topic deemed
inappropriate for Cold War America, female sexuality, and advocates for equal access to
prenatal care regardless of socioeconomic status. Shahn became a favorite villain for
modern art opponents.
The exhibitions were recalled in June 1947 after spending less than a year abroad,
and over the following months Advancing American Art had its budget drastically
reduced. The State Department had no choice but to end the exhibition due to the
communist imputations of its artwork. Critics of the exhibition succeeded in ending it by
branding it “un-American” and linking it with communism.16 With the closing of
Advancing American Art and in light of State Department statements about never
exhibiting communist art, according to Frances Stonor Saunders: “the perception of
avant-garde art as un-American had now been incorporated into official policy.”17 The
closing of the exhibitions drew the battle line for proponents on each side of the modern
art debate, but, perhaps most importantly, unleashed a public wave of criticism of modern
art. Many in the art community lamented the lack of support for modern art and the
significant criticisms coming from officials in the federal government. President Truman
often liked to arise early in the day to visit the National Gallery before it opened and he

15

Krenn, Fall-Out Shelters, 38.
Krenn, Fall-Out Shelters, 56.
17
Frances Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters (New
York: The New Press, 1999): 257.
16

8

Figure 1. Ben Shahn, The Clinic, 1944-45, tempera on paper, 15 5/8 x 22 ¾ in., Georgia
Museum of Art.

9

commented upon viewing the old masters: “It’s a pleasure to look at perfection and then
think of the lazy, nutty moderns. It is like comparing Christ with Lenin.”18 One of the
most boisterous assaults came from Representative George Dondero of Michigan who
claimed “All modern art is communistic” and criticized avant-garde styles:
Cubism aims to destroy by designed disorder. Futurism aims to destroy by the machine
myth…Dadaism to destroy by ridicule. [Abstract] Expressionism aims to destroy by
aping the primitive and insane. Abstractionism aims to destroy by the creation of brainstorms…Surrealism aims to destroy by the denial of reason. 19

Following the cancellation of Advancing American Art, critics, artists, and the art
community were bitter and angry while the State Department was “gun-shy” to engage
with art diplomacy.20
Even with the avalanche of criticism that fell on Advancing American Art, a
number of proponents for art diplomacy survived in the federal government and worked
to redevelop ways to utilize art. After the political fiasco of Advancing American Art it
seemed as though the federal government was wholeheartedly against modern art and art
diplomacy, and many government representatives supported this supposition. This was,
however, never entirely true. Throughout the 1950s there would nearly always be
individuals who supported utilizing modern art for diplomacy, but there was little or no
cohesive effort to defend this position. The federal government, and particularly the state
department, became immobilized, never being able to fully rid itself of support for
modern art nor ever be fully in control of official opinion. Those officials in support of
policies to use art as a diplomatic tool were driven by the escalation of the Cold War as
well as Soviet cultural programs.21

18

Saunders, Cultural Cold War, 252.
Saunders, Cultural Cold War, 253.
20
Krenn, Fall-Out Shelters, 51.
21
Krenn, Fall-Out Shelters, 62-3.
19
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The real challenge became making art diplomacy amenable to critics which
required a fundamental shift in how officials perceived modern art. According to Michael
Krenn, following the Advancing American Art disaster, “instead of as a tool to create a
better world, art was increasingly portrayed as a weapon that might serve the need of
American diplomacy and, perhaps, help thwart the march of communism.”22 With the
transition to the Eisenhower Administration looming, proponents began to speak out for
art diplomacy, and for a particularly American form of art as most representative.
Prominent individuals associated with MoMA and its diplomatic agenda for
modern art described its utility for U.S. international diplomacy. Writing in the Magazine
of Art, Robert Goldwater, a prominent art historian on the faculty of Queen’s College,
critic, and curator, asserted: “We do not believe modern art is in any way subversive of
democracy but rather an expression for American artists.”23 In this statement Goldwater
supported the capitalist vision of Rockefeller and MoMA for modern art.24 The use of
modern art for diplomacy (particularly against communism) was championed by the first
Director of MoMA, Alfred Barr: “The modern artists’ nonconformity and love of
freedom cannot be tolerated within a monolithic tyranny and modern art is useless for the
dictator’s propaganda.”25 Art was an exceptionally viable tool for diplomacy not only
because of the situation presented by the Cold War, but also because “art exhibits
projected truths about the U.S. beyond language, truths that came nearer than other means

22

Krenn, Fall-Out Shelters, 54.
Krenn, Fall-Out Shelters, 58.
24
Goldwater was well connected in the elite circles surrounding MoMA during the 1950s. He co-curated an
exhibition with Rene d’Harnoncourt and wrote the catalog for it: Robert Goldwater and Rene
d’Harnoncourt, Modern Art in Your Life, The Museum of Modern Art (New York: The Museum of Modern
Art, 1949). Meyer Schapiro organized gatherings of art historians that included Robert Goldwater and
Alfred Barr. Goldwater was also the first director for Nelson Rockefeller’s Museum of Primitive Art.
25
Saunders, The Cultural Cold War, 268.
23
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to revealing the national style, spirit, and soul.”26 The term “art” is very general,
however, and the debate that raged over it included many styles and mediums. The debate
was fiercest and most clearly demonstrable in regards to one newly defined style,
Abstract Expressionism.
The American art diplomacy of the mid twentieth century celebrated Abstract
Expressionism. Ann Eden Gibson describes this avant-garde movement as “a rebellious
movement…aimed not only to revolutionize representation by superceding America’s
regionalism, realism, and recognizably national styles like French Cubism, but in doing
so also to oppose America’s isolationism, imperialism, and ethnocentrism.”27 An
alternate definition is that it is a state of mind. It is characterized by a wide array of artist
“ranging from the drip paintings of Jackson Pollock to the intensely coloured floating
shapes of Mark Rothko.”28 As a style, however, it was promulgated as distinctly
American in nature and origin. Frances Stonor Saunders declares that “America’s cultural
mandarins” championed Abstract Expressionism because it was “non-figurative and
[purportedly] politically silent, it was the very antithesis to Socialist Realism. It was
precisely the kind of art the Soviets loved to hate.”29 In a politically conscious statement
made for expressly diplomatic purposes, Nelson Rockefeller declared Abstract
Expressionism was “free enterprise painting.”30 Conversely, the Soviet Union
championed Socialist Realism, a style aimed at imbuing the greatness of the USSR and

26

Arndt, The First Resort of Kings, 364.
Ann Eden Gibson, “Introduction,” in Abstract Expressionism: Other Politics (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1997), xix.
28
“Abstract Expressionism,” The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Art Terms,
http://www.oxfordartonline.com.echo.louisville.edu/subscriber/article/opr/t4/e5[retrieved 11/18/12]
29
Saunders, The Cultural Cold War, 254.
30
Saunders, The Cultural Cold War, 258. The significance of this sentiment cannot be overstated. This idea
propelled Rockefeller’s future endeavors in commodifying Abstract Expressionism to be utilized in
diplomacy.
27
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communism through visually realistic depictions of the idealized daily life of the
proletariat. Its images and symbols were portrayed as rigid, monolithic in size, and a
conglomeration of proscribed attributes rather than original creations. One CIA agent,
indicating how art might deserve some government support, declared of Abstract
Expressionism: “We recognized that this was the kind of art that did not have anything to
do with socialist realism, and made socialist realism look even more stylized and more
rigid and confined than it was.”31
Even with praise coming from the private and public sector, those that opposed
using Abstract Expressionism for art diplomacy found it easy to brand as un-American.
One aspect that made it an easy target was the fact that Pollock, Rothko, and other artists
had been Communist activists in the 1930s, spurring a general dislike of Abstract
Expressionism.32 Another fundamental issue was its non-representational basis. It was
new and while it has figurative predecessors, opponents saw it as highly unfamiliar and
non-traditional. One opponent went so far as to suggest, “If you know how to read them,
modern paintings will disclose the weak spots in US fortifications, and such crucial
constructions as Boulder Dam.”33 Abstract Expressionism was the ideal style for
proponents and the ideal target for opponents.
Nelson Rockefeller sought to showcase new American artwork to the world. He
did not focus on art in general, writes former cultural diplomacy agent Richard T. Arndt,
but specifically modern art from his native country: “Rockefeller seemed [emphasis

31

Saunders, The Cultural Cold War, 260. The stark differences between Abstract Expressionism and
Socialist Realism are easily perceived by viewing Jackson Pollock’s Autumn Rhythm (Number 30), one of
his most popular paintings, and Boris Ioganson’s Lenin's Speech at the Third Congress of the Komsomol, a
highly praised painting which won the Stalin Prize for excellence in art in 1950.
32
Saunders, The Cultural Cold War, 253.
33
Saunders, The Cultural Cold War, 253.
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added] to have had no deeper motive in art export than displaying to the world the quality
of his country’s artistic production.”34 Rockefeller had other more complex motives than
simply exporting his native country’s artistic achievements. This was evident by his
involvement in multiple organizations participating in art diplomacy geared toward
extoling capitalist democracy.
Nelson was the grandson of Standard Oil founder John D. Rockefeller and one of
the five brothers which founded the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. The arts were always a
part of his life and education; due in large part to his mother, Abby Aldrich Rockefeller35,
who was one of the primary founders of MoMA. Rockefeller’s resume during the 1940s
and 1950s includes several government and private positions which allowed him to
influence art diplomacy, including the exhibits sent to Latin America during WWII. In
1954 President Eisenhower appointed Rockefeller his Special Adviser on Cold War
Strategy. In his private life, Rockefeller was a trustee of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund
(RBF). The Fund not only sponsored a think tank on foreign policy but also gave him
philanthropic influence to support institutions and programs of his choice generously.
Rockefeller’s influence allowed him to sponsor a program that launched art diplomacy
from an idea to an effort.
Under the leadership of Nelson Rockefeller, MoMA created its International
Program to carry out art diplomacy neglected by the federal government in 1952.
Rockefeller not only proposed the idea to the Museum board but also provided support

34

Arndt, The First Resort of Kings, 363.
1874-1948. Married John D. Rockefeller Jr., sole heir to Standard Oil. She had six children. One girl,
Abby, and five boys who would create and operate the Rockefeller Brothers Fund: John Davison, III,
Nelson, Laurance, Winthrop, and David.
35

14

from the RBF as its “Treasurer and most active member.”36 Rockefeller explained the
basis of the International Program was to create “exhibitions presenting in foreign
countries and the United States the most significant achievements of the art of our time,
with the aim of promoting greater international understanding and mutual respect.”37 He
believed the International Program was necessary because “The United States
government, unlike those of other countries, had not recognized the need for this form of
cultural exchange, but it was hoped that the Museum’s initiative might ultimately lead to
governmental support of a comparable program.”38 Following the backlash to Advancing
American Art, proponents of modern art perceived a bleak situation. This was believed
not only due to the lack of government programs for exporting American culture abroad,
but also because Congressional forces were attempting to stymie its very existence.
According to Helen M. Franc, writing on behalf of MoMA, by 1952 when the
International Program was initiated:
The government had either foregone any responsibility for cultural exchange or had
shown itself completely subservient to the Red-hunting forces in Congress—not only
Senator Joseph McCarthy’s relatively short lived hearings of the 1950-53 but also the
much longer-lasting operations of the House Un-American Activities Committee.39

The International Program was a capable organization but was unequipped to achieve the
goals MoMA had for it.
A year after the creation of the International Program, the International Council
was established October 8, 1953. The general purpose of the International Council was to
serve as an advisory body for the International Program and coordinate with other

36

Helen M. Franc, “The Early Years of the International Program and Council,” in The Museum of Modern
Art at Mid-Century: At Home and Abroad, ed by John Szarkowski and John Elderfield (New York: The
Museum of Modern Art, 1995): 109.
37
Franc, “The Early Years,” 109.
38
Franc, “The Early Years,” 109.
39
Franc, “The Early Years,” 114.
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institutions across the country to foster the exchange of cultural materials.40 Mrs. John D.
Rockefeller III41, serving as its chair, stated of the International Council:
[it] is to help provide for the interchange or ideas and the exchange of cultural materials
which can lead to a greater understanding and mutual respect among nations…While
many national governments abroad have recognized this need and supplied official means
for this exchange, our own government, particularly in the field of modern art, has left
this responsibility to individual enterprise and support.42

Mrs. Rockefeller concisely points out the government’s failure to support art diplomacy
and eagerness to avoid modern art. Within the first year of the International Council’s
existence it coordinated with the wife of Ambassador L. Corrin Strong located in Oslo,
Norway, to send an exhibition of American artwork to hang in the embassy residence.
The AIEP considers this exchange the first embassy exhibition in its lineage. It
would be another decade, however, before the State Department formally initiated the
program. The exhibition in Oslo was done on a trial basis but laid the foundation for
future efforts and Mrs. L. Corrin Strong would be an essential character to future
development. This exchange also solidified MoMA’s position in the legacy of the AIEP.
It did not take long for the art-conscious public to notice the International
Program’s and International Council’s activities. In 1954, Art Digest proclaimed of
MoMA’s activities:
‘the naiveté of our officials is in some degree compensated for by the cultural
sophistication of our private citizens, institutions and agencies.’ This was ‘the most
effective antidote to the virulent anti-Americanism that exists today all over the world.
We can be grateful that we have private citizens and institutions of sufficient conscience
to undertake them and sufficient means to pay for them.43

The first exhibition organized by the International Council was 12 American Painters and
Sculptors. It received extensive press coverage at home and abroad with a diversity of
40
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reactions. Significantly, the exhibition was free to display works by controversial artist
such as Shahn and Pollock because it was privately funded.44 The International Council
did not desire its exhibits to be completely privately funded but did so to maintain its own
agenda, under the guise of high standards of artistic integrity and quality. At the same
time the International Council was founded, the federal government also founded a
program with similar goals use art as a diplomatic tool.
President Eisenhower created the United States Information Agency (USIA) in
1953 opening an avenue for art diplomacy. USIA was established to be an “independent
organization responsible for all the country’s information activities abroad.”45 Its stated
purpose was “to submit evidence to people of other nations…that the objective and
policies of the United States are in harmony with and will continue to advance their
legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress, and peace” and to avoid “strident and
propagandistic material.”46 The use of propagandistic material is nearly certain and is a
discussion for another essay, but it is clear USIA and MoMA shared the diplomatic goal
of using American “products” to demonstrate the superiority of American society. While
USIA was created to distribute a vast array of materials, one of its activities was art
exhibitions. Initiatives like USIA were wholeheartedly supported by another unique
private organization besides the International Council.
Privately organized in 1948, the Committee on Government and Art completed a
study of the relationship between the arts and government in 1954. Lloyd Goodrich, then
Associate Director of the Whitney Museum of American Art, was chair of the Committee
when he wrote: “one of the most essential governmental art activities today should be
44
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exchanges of art exhibitions, material [emphasis added] and personnel with other nations.
In the present world situation, the importance of this is too obvious to need lengthy
discussion.”47 By referring to artworks as “material,” Goodrich uses commodifying
language that agrees with MoMA’s framework for making modern art into a diplomatic
tool. Goodrich asserted such diplomacy could not be done without government support.
In a Committee Report from 1954, Goodrich states:
[The Committee] recognizes that contemporary art is extremely diverse, including many
valid but differing viewpoints, and that to represent these viewpoints in a balanced
manner is one of the chief problems involved. It believes that governmental policies
should be guided by bodies which are free from political influence. 48

Goodrich uses an aestheticizing argument for the artwork by calling for advisory bodies
free of politics. Such bodies, according to Goodrich, would select works of art strictly on
their artistic merits, not for their utility as diplomatic tools. Aestheticizing artwork was a
fundamental aspect of commodification, a topic which will be discussed further in section
4. The following year, significant figures from the federal government spoke in favor of
the same idea.
Speaking at MoMA in 1955, George Keenan and President Eisenhower affirmed
their belief in art diplomacy. Both men lauded the efforts of the International Program
and International Council when they delivered speeches at MoMA. Keenan, the architect
of Cold War “containment policy” stated at a dinner at MoMA:
’we are gradually becoming aware for the first time of the frightening extent to which
negative conceptions about us prevail to one degree or another abroad.’ America was
increasingly viewed as ‘vulgar, materialistic nouveaux riches, lacking in manners and in
sensitivity, interested only in making money, contemptuous of every refinement of
esthetic feeling.’ Therefore it was important to ‘show the outside world both that we have
a cultural life and that we care something about it.’ If this could be done, ‘I for my part
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would willingly trade the entire remaining inventory of political propaganda for the
results that could be achieved by such means alone.[emphasis added]’49

President Eisenhower also stated at a MoMA dinner in 1955 how he embraced modern
art as a “pillar of liberty.”50 The President elaborated on this sentiment:
As long as artists are at liberty to feel with high personal intensity, as long as our artists
are free to create with sincerity and conviction, there will be healthy controversy and
progress in art…How different it is in tyranny. When artists are made the slaves and the
tools of the state; when artists become chief propagandists of a cause, progress is arrested
and creation and genius are destroyed.51

With the addresses of Keenan and President Eisenhower there were significant
proponents from the public sector which supported the efforts of the International
Program and International Council to utilize modern American art for diplomacy.
Due to continued opposition throughout the federal government, however, the
sentiments of Keenan and President Eisenhower were not implemented. One such
example came when the USIA refused to continue support of an exhibition because of
some of the artists represented. The exhibition was organized in 1956 in co-sponsorship
with the American Federation of Art(AFA). It featured 100 paintings by 75 artists,
“surveying the major trends in American art from the turn of the twentieth century to the
present, including representative examples from realism to abstraction.”52 USIA deemed
ten of the artists “social hazards”53 and demanded the AFA remove them. The AFA
refused to censor the show so the opinion of the White House was sought to resolve the
issue. The exhibit was cancelled and from then on “there would be no government
sponsorship of overseas exhibitions that included paintings made after 1917 (a significant

49

Krenn, Fall-Out Shelters, 90.
Saunders, Cultural Cold War, 271.
51
Saunders, Cultural Cold War, 272.
52
Franc, “The Early Years,” 117.
53
Franc, “The Early Years,” 117.
50

19

date because it was that of the Russian Revolution).”54 Art diplomacy proponents were
aghast at the President’s actions given his statements a year earlier at MoMA.55 The
President’s actions also demonstrate a further aspect of the government’s inconsistency in
regard to the official opinion of modern art. Verbal support for the International Council
as well as the establishment of the USIA came from President Eisenhower, but at a
decisive moment he discredited modern art for diplomacy.
Government officials had once again contradicted their position on the debate
over modern art by hindering the activities of the USIA. The official policy set by
President Eisenhower indicated the State Department and USIA would not fully support
“freedom of expression” or cease blacklisting artists.56 Rene d’Harnoncourt, then director
of MoMA, declared: “since the USIA had to work within a framework determined by
political, rather than solely artistic[emphasis added], considerations, its presentations
inevitably were tinged with an atmosphere of propaganda.”57 D’Harnoncourt asserts
MoMA’s dedication to aesthetics, a crucial aspect of the Museum’s commodification of
the artwork. It was clear the bulk of the initiative for art diplomacy would continue to
rely on the International Program and International Council.
Instead of the U.S. government, MoMA organized the majority of American
presence and representation at the international art shows held in Venice and São Paulo
throughout the first half of the twentieth century.58 The first Venice Biennale was held in
1895 and its general purpose was to serve as a world’s fair exclusively for art. U.S.
representation at the Venice Biennale was privately organized until 1964 when the USIA
54
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took over. In the decade before official support was granted, the international community
took note of the lack of U.S. government involvement. One of the earliest efforts of the
International Council as stated in a press release was the “organization of exhibitions for
the United States Pavilion at the[1954] Venice Biennale, just purchased by funds
provided for the International Program.”59 At the 1954 Biennale where the U.S.
representation was organized by MoMA, it was the only privately facilitated effort
among twenty nations.60 USIA staff was prohibited from participating because of the
inclusion of artists such as Shahn in the exhibition.61 Just one year earlier at the São
Paolo Biennale, the U.S. was the only major power not to support its national presence.62
MoMA continued to organize exhibitions in São Paulo, commenting on its efforts in
1957: “The United States section unlike those of other countries was not government
sponsored but was organized at the invitation of the Bienal authorities by the
International Program of [MoMA] …and presented under the auspices of the newly
established International Council.”63 With the International Program and International
Council organizing the exhibitions, MoMA was free to send a collection of paintings by
controversial artist Pollock, which was the feature of American representation in 1957.
The Venice and São Paolo Biennials served as defining moments for official, especially
State Department, support for the arts, in which the government clearly abdicated its
ownership.
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There were, however, limited instances during the 1950s where the USIA and
State department provided indirect support. The government programs’ support came in
the form of subsidizing transportation costs and exhibition catalogues while the
International Council supported art and artists unable to gain government support.64 It is
important to recognize that by organizing the catalogues, federal agencies were then able
to control the interpretive texts and critical framework for exhibitions. When the USIA
staff was prohibited from participating in the 1954 Venice Biennale, it was not due to a
lack of eagerness on the part of the agency. The ambassador to Italy vehemently opposed
modern art and thwarted their efforts. In 1955 and 1956, exhibits were held in Barcelona
and London. Barcelona received assistance from the Embassy in Madrid and the London
exhibit was done in cooperation with the U.S. Embassy there. Ben Shahn and art
historian Meyer Shapiro were sent to London to deliver lectures in conjunction with the
exhibition. Each had their travel expenses covered, Shahn by the International Council
and Shapiro by the State Department.65 One of the purposes for founding the
International Program and International Council was to encourage government
participation and support which it did through such collaborations.
The exhibitions MoMA was creating were certainly successful in their own right,
but were not eliciting the desired level of response from Washington. Porter McCray,
director of the International Program, writing to Rene d’Harnoncourt in 1956 said:
Especially in view of the USIA’s present orientation and the probability that
exhibitions assembled under its auspices may become increasingly conservative,
it seems that The Museum of Modern Art is the only institution likely to

64
65

Franc, “The Early Years,” 122.
Franc, “The Early Years,” 127.

22

organize this kind of representation for showing abroad and our obligation to do
so is thereby all the greater.66

This lack of response also frustrated the International Council, but allowed it to utilize the
most contested style of the era—Abstract Expressionism. Throughout the 1950s, writes
Franc, the International Program’s activities “coincided with the ascendancy of the first
indigenous American style of modern painting to attract international attention, Abstract
Expressionism” and its exhibitions, supported indirectly by the world’s foremost
superpower, “led to recognition of its validity and worldwide influence.”67 The
exhibitions offered a mix of wartime US guests such as Marcel Duchamp with native
artists and “the mix proclaimed that America had assimilated Europe’s best and become a
new world art center.”68 Abstract Expressionism was the leading American style and
MoMA’s efforts were pushing it abroad. Even if there were private desires within the
USIA or State Department to “push Abstract Expressionism, the reality of the McCarthy
era was that the agency could not co-organize an exhibit of such vanguard art.”69 For the
first time in history the United States was the leader in the art world and sending its art
abroad, just not in an official capacity. In spite of the government’s inability to directly
champion Abstract Expressionism it continued to encourage programs to send American
art abroad, which also coincided with MoMA’s own agenda.
These continued efforts resulted in the first program directly related to the AIEP
and represented a major step toward its creation. President Eisenhower initiated the
“People to People” program in 1957 which “established a subcommittee on American Art
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in Embassies and Consulates”.70 The program was underfunded and produced few
results—only 18 paintings were donated to the State Department and fewer than 60 loans
were made. MoMA recognized the “People to People” program was not succeeding and
in response began its own embassy program.71
In 1960 MoMA initiated its Art in Embassies Project that expanded its original
embassies efforts from 1953. About the project, a May 11, 1960 press release from
MoMA states: “The purpose of the plan is to make available original works of art for the
residences of our ambassadors and foreign service officers in order to represent American
creative achievements and to demonstrate this country’s interest in the visual arts.”72 The
release also traces the history of the “Art in Embassies” initiative:
The original impetus for ‘Art in Embassies’ was given by Mrs. L. Corrin Strong when
she and her husband went to Norway when he was appointed United States Ambassador
there in 1953. At her bequest a number of works of art were lent by the Museum of
Modern Art and other collectors. The success of this trial experiment led Mrs. Strong and
other members of the [Art in Embassies] Committee to raise special funds and to
organize this project so that many United States Embassies in various parts of the world
could borrow American works of art and works by artists of other nationalities to hang in
their official residences.73

MoMA’s Project was sending artwork not only by modern American artists but also
modern European artists. In spite of the volatile nature of the artwork being utilized by
the Project, the press release also states: “From its inception, the ‘Art in Embassies’
project, which is being administered by the Museum of Modern Art, has benefited from
the advice and encouragement of the United States Department of State.”74 Even though
the federal government repeatedly expressed its distaste for modern art, the actions of the
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State Department do not reflect this to be a universal opinion, further evidence of the
inconsistency of official opinion.
Two years after the Project’s creation, reports indicate more embassies began
displaying controversial artwork. A 1962 press release from MoMA lists Ben Shahn as
having works in embassies. A separate report also stated that “A unique collection of
Rothkos hung in Edward Stone’s graceful embassy in [New] Delhi so successfully that
the embassy had to set up weekend visiting hours.”75 MoMA considered the Art in
Embassies Project as another necessity for it to undertake due to the lack of government
action. Waldo Rusmussen, then director of the International Council, “characterized its
project as an attempt to stimulate the government’s involvement in the visual arts.”76 That
is exactly what the Project did although the immediate reaction was of a defensive nature.
The State Department was concerned with the artwork MoMA was placing on embassy
walls.77 The exhibitions were now encroaching on government property on an ad hoc
basis at the bequest of ambassadors and other government officials abroad. According to
Andrew Solomon, writing for the AIEP, while the exhibitions the International Council
created for embassies were done in cooperation with the State Department, they were not
sanctioned under any policy. As ambassadors increasingly relied on the International
Council, “it became clear that the display of such exhibitions had political
ramifications.”78
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Robert H. Thayer, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, wrote a report in
1961 outlining how the State Department should take over the Project’s activities in an
official capacity. Thayer’s report represented both sides of the argument over modern and
contemporary art. He wrote embassies “can and should become windows through which
the people of foreign countries can see American works of art of all kinds and periods.”79
The artwork going on embassy walls, however, should be selected by a panel which
would “afford ample protection to the Department on the many controversial issues
which exist in the field of the arts, particularly in the field of contemporary art.”80 The
panel Thayer called for would protect the integrity of the art, but also the State
Department from Congressional onslaughts. He outlined a detailed system of checks:
Ambassadors should be instructed by the Secretary of State that no changes should be
made in the decoration of the Embassies or of the reception rooms of their residences
without the approval of the Panel of Interior Design evidenced by a letter from the
Executive Secretary of the Panel. 81

Simultaneously, Thayer also declared that “criticism from the Congress and elsewhere is
bound to descend on any group making a selection of contemporary art, but this is all the
more reason for the appointment of a selection committee of the highest quality whose
distinction and objectivity will with stand all political onslaughts.”82
Much of the report is dedicated to the machinery of Thayer’s ideal State
Department operated program, but lacked attention to theory. The Thayer Report was
largely silent on the fundamental theories or opinions that would dictate the curatorial
process of the AIEP. Thayer used phrases such as “accurately reflect American life” and
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offer “some of the cultural impact and flavor of the United States”83 to describe his ideal
kind of art. The report did not name any artists or particular styles other than
contemporary and traditional. Thayer offered precise machinery to direct decisions, but
little as to how those decisions should actually be made. It was further evidence of the
lack of coherency in the opinion of the federal government in regard to utilizing modern
art for diplomacy. The language in the report was appropriately vague to appease all
parties. Thayer’s report was a departure from MoMA’s Project when he called for the
government’s program to only display American artwork.84 This was, perhaps, a
politically savvy concession by Thayer to focus only on American artwork to appease
conservative Congressional leaders opposed to modern art.
Two years after Thayer wrote his report President Kennedy acted on the
suggestions and created the AIEP. The last appointee President Kennedy made before his
assassination in 1963 was Nancy Kefauver to head the AIEP. The wife of the late Senator
Estes Kefauver, Kefauver had taken art lessons in her native Scotland as well as in Paris,
and was an amateur artist. She possessed little professional training as a curator and had
not been highly active in the arts community since her youth. Later in his life, Thayer
candidly wrote to a colleague: “Unfortunately, the first appointee [of the AIEP] was a
purely political one, Mrs. Kefauver, who had had no experience in the arts and whose
taste, frankly, was subject to considerable question.”85 Despite her lack of experience,
with little funding and a limited staff Kefauver aggressively began sending artwork to
embassies following in MoMA’s footsteps.
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While differing in certain aspects politically, the AIEP was an extension of the
International Council’s Art in Embassy Project. The AIEP had two stated purposes at its
founding. One was to “enhance the physical beauty of the embassy residences,” but more
significantly was “to suggest the depth and quality of a nation that in a little over two
hundred years had come of age culturally.”86 At its founding, the AIEP “sent
contemporary or recent work abroad” and “The early emphasis on newer material was an
outgrowth of the policies of the International Council.”87 The AIEP adopted and
continued MoMA’s agenda to commodify Abstract Expressionist paintings to make them
powerful tools of international diplomacy. It is also important to remember, writes
Solomon, “that though American commitment to American art had been well established
for many years, foreign interest in American art escalated in the ‘50s and early ‘60s.”88
The AIEP was a direct descendent of MoMA’s effort to push Abstract Expressionism
abroad. President Kennedy had to establish the AIEP by executive order which was
“made necessary by the congressional refusal to fund art for embassy walls.”89 Congress
maintained its opposition to modern art as well as activities reflective of the International
Council.
Following its creation, however, the AIEP was not enthusiastically embraced nor
excused from criticism within the federal government. The incoherency of official
opinion toward art diplomacy remained into the 1960s. The political environment the
AIEP was founded in, states Douglas McCreary Greenwood writing on behalf of AIEP,
was not much different from when the International Program and International Council
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were founded: “Implications from the McCarthy era that contemporary art was either
subversive or Communist-inspired, or both, lingered long into the Sixties.”90 President
Nixon in a White House memo dated January 26, 1970 stated: “As you, of course, know
those who are on the modern art and music kick are 95 percent against us anyway. I refer
to the recent addicts of Leonard Bernstein and the whole New York crowd.”91 Another
term for Abstract Expressionism in the 1950s was the “New York School” and it made
New York City an art capital of the world. President Nixon had been involved in the
national scene long enough to know this. He also added a post script to his memo which
stated: “I also want a check made with regard to the incredibly atrocious modern art that
has been scattered around the embassies around the world,” and concludes:
We, of course, cannot tell the Ambassadors what kind of art they personally have, but I
found in travelling around the world that many of our Ambassadors were displaying the
modern art due to the fact that they were compelled to because of some committee which
once was headed up by Mrs. Kefauver [a Democrat] and where they were loaned some of
these little uglies from the Museum of Modern Art in New York. At least, I want a quiet
check made—not one that is going to hit the newspapers and stir up all the troops—but I
simply want it understood that this Administration is going to turn away from the policy
of forcing our embassies abroad or those who receive assistance from the United States at
home to move in the direction of off-beat art, music and literature.92

If the AIEP was a direct extension of the efforts to push Abstract Expressionism and
American art abroad, President Nixon represented an extension of the efforts to counter
it, perhaps having more to do with his perceived political enemies than the art itself.
More in depth research needs to be done to determine how effective the President’s
request was at removing modern art from embassy walls, but one can surmise that the
continuous efforts of the AIEP throughout his Administration are evidence he was not
very successful. This was also likely true because not all the efforts to put art in
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embassies were immediately transferred to the auspices of the State Department as
MoMA and the Woodward Foundation continued their efforts.
While its exhibits enjoyed success from the beginning of its efforts, the AIEP was
underfunded and understaffed necessitating the continued assistance of private efforts.
An April 1966 press release from MoMA provides an update of its own Art in Embassies
Project and also states: “Last year the State Department also began a program under the
aegis of Mrs. Nancy Kefauver and has supplied art for 25 embassies. As there are 115
embassies, and as the collections change as ambassadors change, all three agencies are
fully occupied.”93 The third agency referenced here is the Woodward Foundation, a
private initiative created to carry out similar activities as the International Council’s
Project. The Foundation was much smaller than the Project but made generous loans
from its own private collection of modern and contemporary art.
The activities of the AIEP were suddenly altered in November, 1967 with the
unexpected death of Nancy Kefauver. Kefauver was attending a banquet at the White
House on November 22 when she collapsed and later died at the age of 55 as the result of
a stroke. In just over four years Kefauver brought the AIEP to life and curated exhibitions
at politically strategic locations such as the U.S. Embassy in Copenhagen, Moscow,
Kuala Lumpur, and New Delhi. The loss of Kefauver’s vigor essentially ceased AIEP
exhibitions until her successor was named more than a year later. She had been thrust into
a volatile contemporary art market and a contentious period of U.S. history, a situation
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she had not been prepared for. Despite this Kefauver entered and maneuvered within the
mid-century American avant-garde scene with confidence. Kefauver’s brief career as the
Director of the AIEP was marked by her unique curatorial decisions which will be the
focus of section 6.

31

THE MUSEUM OF MODERN ART: COLD WAR CONDUIT

A discussion of the ascension of Abstract Expressionism must be about the
Museum of Modern Art as much as the artwork itself. The story of Abstract
Expressionism is intertwined with MoMA at a fundamental level. Abstract
Expressionism had the precedents for its reception as well as its position in American
society deeply influenced through MoMA officials. They were able to do this through the
network of prominent characters involved with the institution, their affiliations, and the
exhibition schedule they planned for Abstract Expressionist artwork. The most prominent
of these figures was Nelson Rockefeller. His ties to MoMA can be traced back to the
institution’s inception as his mother Abby Aldrich Rockefeller was one of the cofounders. That Rockefeller served as the museum’s president throughout most of the
1940s and 50s clearly shows the access he had to the institution. Abstract Expressionism
was one of his keenest artistic interests within his personal collection, exceeding 2,500
works in this style which he considered examples of “free enterprise painting.”94 The
wartime exhibitions he planned as the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs for
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and while serving as President Dwight D.
Eisenhower’s special advisor on Cold War strategy in 1954, and the briefings he received
from CIA officials about covert cultural operations nearly certify that Rockefeller was
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aware of government aims and activities.95 Considering his position as the president of
MoMA, his influence on the International Council, and as a trustee of the Rockefeller
Brothers Fund, Rockefeller “presided over some of the most influential minds of the
period as they thrashed out definitions of American foreign policy.”96
One of these individuals was Tom Braden who was MoMA’s managing director97
between 1947 and 1949. After Braden no longer worked at MoMA he became a CIA
official closely linked to covert non-military aspects of the Cold War. Art was, for him,
mainly a tool that could be controlled; in his view “progressive artists need an elite to
subsidize them, the public is incapable of recognizing good art.”98 Patronage involved
much more than supporting an artist or their art: Braden’s conception was that it “carried
with it a duty to instruct, to educate people to accept not what they want, or think they
want, but what they ought to have.”99 This desire to construct and maintain an elite
establishment was evident in the agenda of another MoMA official.
William Burden’s involvement at MoMA spanned multiple decades. He joined
the Advisory Committee in 1940, was appointed chairman of the Committee on Museum
Collections in 1947, and in 1956 he became MoMA’s president. In his private life he was
a highly successful venture capitalist and a descendent of “commodore” Vanderbilt.
Burden “epitomized the Cold War establishment.”100 Men like Rockefeller, Braden, and
Burden represented a presence of not only the establishment within MoMA, but a link to
official government Cold War policy for culture.
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This link is pivotal for understanding how MoMA and the U.S. government
sought to utilize modern art. MoMA and its International Council sought to publically
appear to be functioning independently, but were actually operating as a nexus for Cold
War cultural initiatives. The listed men and their colleagues created an ambiguous
network of links to the private sector and federal agencies, namely the CIA and the State
Department. Individuals operating at the top of MoMA’s hierarchy funneled and
processed agendas meant to promulgate, through international exhibitions, the
government’s idealistic vision of American culture. Rockefeller and his elitist colleagues
influenced MoMA’s “big picture” agenda, but they also had to make that agenda manifest
in the day-to-day operations.
These agendas were transformed into institutional initiatives and exhibitions by
the leading members of MoMA’s staff who were cognizant of diplomatic ramifications.
MoMA’s second director Rene d’Harnoncourt served as a liaison for Rockefeller and his
committee members to implement their cultural diplomacy agenda. When d’Harnoncourt
assumed the directorship in 1949 under Braden’s presidency, he became the custodian for
access to MoMA’s influence and abilities as an institution. He not only controlled access
to the physical and intellectual resources MoMA constituted, but openly sought support
for initiatives in Congress. Believing that “modern art in its infinite variety and ceaseless
exploration” was the “foremost symbol” of democracy, he lobbied Congress to support
anti-Communist cultural campaigns.101 During those years he also reported to the State
Department. Before d’Harnoncourt became director, his predecessor, Barr, had labored in
a concerted campaign within the arts community to promote Abstract Expressionism as a
unique and original American style.
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Alfred Barr served as the first director of MoMA from 1929 to 1943. Abby
Aldrich Rockefeller invited Barr to the directorship where he would cultivate Abstract
Expressionism from an institutional position. Barr utilized tactical precision and cunning
to achieve his goals for promoting modern art. The significance of Abstract
Expressionism was evident to him early on in his directorship but he was not blind to the
opposition toward it. In a tactful, if not outright deceptive, manner he relied on a “twopronged” approach whereby he scheduled exhibitions of romantic or representational
artwork to appease prevailing tastes.102 This allowed him to simultaneously acquire
Abstract Expressionist paintings and subtly garner support for such works.103
Out of this web of individuals and institutional affiliations, MoMA played a
prominent role in establishing Abstract Expressionism as the dominant and original
American style. The extent and impact of that influence, however, is a point of contention
among art historians including Eva Cockcroft, Michael Kimmelman, Frances Stonor
Saunders, and David Craven. One contested issue in this vast scholarship is the analysis
of Abstract Expressionism’s relationship with the federal government as an instrument of
diplomacy. Among these scholars a main point of debate is the extent and thoroughness
to which MoMA acted as an agent for the federal government in utilizing Abstract
Expressionism as a diplomatic “weapon.”
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Eva Cockcroft wrote one of the earliest and most effective essays analyzing
MoMA’s involvement. In “Abstract Expressionism: Weapon of the Cold War,”
Cockcroft argues that MoMA promulgated Abstract Expressionism for political ends:
Links between cultural cold war politics and the success of Abstract Expressionism are
by no means coincidental, or unnoticeable. They were consciously forged at the time by
some of the most influential figures controlling museum policies and advocating
enlightened cold war tactics designed to woo European intellectuals.104

Cockcroft highlights the International Program and International Council as “major
supporters” of Abstract Expressionism through their use of it as an implement of Cold
War diplomacy. MoMA did not push Abstract Expressionism abroad as part of
international diplomacy for purely patriotic reasons: the Museum tried to establish its
own dominance within the international and domestic art community. Figures such as
Rockefeller, Braden, d’Harnoncourt, and Barr are dissected to show how they functioned
as agents of cultural diplomacy for the CIA. Modern art exhibitions produced by the
International Program consisting primarily of Abstract Expressionist artworks were sent
to international exhibitions in London, São Paulo, Paris, and Tokyo. Cockcroft highlights
how most other nations’ artworks at such exhibitions were government-sponsored,
lending the International Program a “quasi-official character” by association.105 MoMA
had to sponsor these exhibitions due to limitations placed on the CIA and State
Department by Congress. As a private non-profit organization, the Museum was free to
put on such exhibitions extoling life and benefits under capitalism. Because the Museum
was “freed from the kinds of pressure of unsubtle red-baiting and super-jingoism applied
to official governmental agencies” it could push federal cultural agendas in a subtler,
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more productive fashion.106 Cockcroft clearly establishes the intricate web of
relationships and interests existing between MoMA and the CIA during the McCarthy
years.
Following Cockcroft’s condemning essay a number of art historians reasserted her
argument from the later 1970s through the early 1990s. Eventually, however, MoMA
mounted a counterattack to her accusations. Art critic Kimmelman, writing for MoMA in
its publication The Museum of Modern Art at Mid-Century: At Home and Abroad,
attempted to use statistical data to debunk Cockcroft and her affiliates. He also attempted
to demonstrate that MoMA’s critics were a product of their historical context.
Kimmelman writes with feigned authority to undermine Cockcroft and her fellow
critics. He attempts to debunk them based on their own context: “Context is essential to
revisionist historians and critics. And their critique of the Modern has a context as well.
Namely the late 1960s and early 1970s, the era of the Vietnam War and domestic social
upheaval.”107 He references such happenings as the covert bombing of Laos and the
Watergate scandal, which spurred widespread distrust of government and those affiliated
with it. Kimmelman attempts to equate Cockcroft’s critical art history with the antiestablishment sentiments of the era, as opposed to the very established nature of MoMA
by this time.
Beyond their historical context Kimmelman anatomizes Cockcroft’s statistical
data and reading of that data. Kimmelman writes:
The Modern did not, as Cockroft [sic]108 contended, take sole responsibility for the U.S.
representation at the Biennales from 1954 through 1962: It ceded that task twice—to The
Art Institute of Chicago (in 1956) and to The Baltimore Museum of Art (1960). As for
the Sao Paulo Bienal, the Modern put together only three of the U.S. exhibitions between
106
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1953 and 1965 (in 1953, 1957, and 1961); others were organized by the San Francisco
Museum of Modern Art (1955), the Walker Art Center (1963), the Minneapolis Institute
(1959), and the Pasadena Art Museum (1965).109

According to Kimmelman, not only are portions of Cockcrofts data incorrect, but also her
interpretation of correct data are flawed. Writing about Cockcroft’s analysis of MoMA’s
exhibition of 1955-56 “Modern Art in the United States,” Kimmelman asserts:
Cockroft claimed [“Modern Art in the United States”] included a dozen Abstract
Expressionists, had works by 112 artists in all.
How is one to judge the meaning of such statistics, in any case? Is the number of
participants or pictures a reliable guide to the character of an exhibition? What about the
placement and size of the pictures? What about the language of the exhibition’s
promotional and educational materials? What about the extent to which the art may, or
may not, have been selected and analyzed in ways indebted to Abstract Expressionist
values?
One needs to know more about the big survey of 112 artists organized by
Dorothy Miller, for example, which Cockroft cited. Did the Abstract Expressionists
culminate a chronological progression, or did they constitute a critical mass that
outnumbered any other cluster of artists? The evidence is ambiguous. 110

Kimmelman takes a strategically astute approach by calling attention to such curatorial
aspects as gallery layout and educational material. An exhibition cannot be judged solely
by the artwork included, but the curators have a significant impact through their myriad
choices in how to exhibit those works, an aspect Cockcroft neglects.
Kimmelman does not deny a link between MoMA and Abstract Expressionism
existed but he argues that relationship had been sensationalized. MoMA sent numerous
exhibitions containing Abstract Expressionist works abroad, but Kimmelman argues
MoMA was not always the initiator of the efforts. Referencing a 1956 exhibition held in
Europe, Kimmelman writes: “D’Harnoncourt’s foreword to the American catalogue
reiterates … ‘The New American Painting was organized at the request of European
institutions…”111
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The evidence all points, for Kimmelman, away from MoMA. Acquisitions and
exhibition rosters demonstrate how critics of MoMA over-assert superficial links between
anti-Communist cultural programs and the Museum’s embrace of Abstract
Expressionism. Kimmelman, however, overstates his own argument when he declares:
“In fact, the Modern would seem to have been slow to take up Abstract Expressionism’s
cause. Its circulating shows stressed European masters, as did shows at the Museum.”112
Kimmelman ultimately concedes that Cockcroft and her affiliates were not fundamentally
wrong in arguing MoMA embraced Abstract Expressionism, but he claims their argument
was sensationalized and ascribed non-existent intent. The proliferation of Abstract
Expressionism was certainly encouraged by MoMA, but Kimmelman argues that
relationship was not as concrete or purposeful as Cockcroft and her affiliates profess. The
“statistical and historical assumptions” they make, according to Kimmelman, do not align
with the evidence.113 Kimmelman’s assessment of Cockcroft’s argument would seem to
undermine her analysis, his own analysis, however, also has significant flaws.
Five years after Kimmelman’s essay appeared in a MoMA publication, Frances
Stonor Saunders published a book focusing on the use of culture as a diplomatic tool in
the United States during the Cold War. In her chaptered titled “Yanqui Doodles”
Saunders analyzes the triangular relationship between MoMA, the CIA, and Abstract
Expressionism. Acknowledging the manifold ties and cultural influence between MoMA
officials and the CIA, Saunders does not find their relationship startling, but rather selfevident of mid-century Cold War America. The social and sometimes official links of this
relationship are not enough to definitively prove a conspiracy between MoMA and the
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CIA to advance Abstract Expressionism. Those links, however, are numerous and
intertwined forming a comfortable network that demonstrates some level of official
connection between MoMA and the federal government.114 While the relationships and
ties Cockcroft and fellow revisionist art historians cite form a supposition, the amount of
evidence makes it difficult, if not impossible, to undermine their argument.
Saunders shifts her focus to Kimmelman and MoMA’s defenders. In a single
paragraph, Saunders is able to undermine his argument:
MoMA’s defenders have consistently attacked the claim that the museum’s support of
Abstract Expressionism was in any way linked to the covert advancement of America’s
international image. Curiously, one argument they use is that MoMA actually neglected
the movement when it first emerged. ‘The Modern’s exhibitions of Abstract
Expressionism, more so at home, but also abroad, came on the whole only during the
later fifties, by which time the movement’s first generation had already been followed by
a second,’ wrote Michael Kimmelman, in a rebuttal commissioned by MoMA. To argue
that MoMA simply missed what was right under its nose is disingenuous, and ignores the
fact that the museum had steadily and consistently collected works by the Abstract
Expressionists from the time of their earliest appearance. From 1941, MoMA acquired
works by Arshile Gorky, Alexander Calder, Frank Stella, Robert Motherwell, Jackson
Pollock, Stuart Davis and Adolph Gottlieb. In May 1944, the museum sold at auction
‘certain of its nineteenth century works of art to provide funds for the purchase of
twentieth century works.’ Although receipts from the sale were disappointing, enough
cash was made available to purchase ‘important paintings by Pollock, Motherwell, and
Matta.’ Thus, as might be expected of a museum of modern art, and particularly one
which acknowledged that it held ‘a tremendous moral responsibility toward living artists
whose careers and fortunes can be drastically affected by the Museum’s support or lack
of it,’ was the new generation of American painters brought into its fold. 115

Saunders continues, demonstrating Kimmelman is not only mistaken about the
relationship of MoMA and Abstract Expressionism, but also uses other examples to show
intent:
The Museum of Modern Art was neither free from propaganda, nor from government
figures. When, for example, it accepted the contract to supply the art exhibit for the
Congress for Cultural Freedom’s 1952 Masterpieces festival in Paris, it did so under the
auspices of trustees who were fully cognizant of the CIA’s role in that organization.
Moreover, the exhibit’s curator, James Johnson Sweeney (a member of MoMA’s
advisory committee, and of the American Committee for Cultural Freedom), publicly
endorsed the propaganda value of the show when he announced: ‘On display will be
masterpieces that could not have been created nor whose exhibition would be allowed by
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such totalitarian regimes as Nazi Germany or present-day Soviet Russia and her
satellites.’116

A litany of other examples is provided to further demonstrate the point that MoMA was
acting at the very least in line with, if not at the behest of, government officials and
agendas. Previous art historians focused on the actions (or proposed inactions) of MoMA
and the level of involvement and influence of the federal government.
In 1999, the same year Saunders published her book, Craven also published a
study of Abstract Expressionism and its role as a weapon of the Cold War. Craven
utilizes unpublished correspondence and documents, recently declassified FBI files, and
personal interviews to formulate a fresh perspective of Abstract Expressionism in the
1950s and 1960s. In his book Abstract Expressionism as Cultural Critique: Dissent
During the McCarthy Period, Craven reestablishes the position and relationship of
Abstract Expressionist art and artists to the culture, society, and government of the
United States. “The anti-movement known as Abstract Expressionism,” Craven asserts,
“should be defined more in terms of what it opposed than in light of any one opposition
that it proposed.”117
Craven does not argue that past art historians are wrong, but rather they did not
see the entire picture and exaggerated their claims. “There has been considerable
exaggeration by art historians on both the Right and the Left,” Craven writes:
about the degree of success enjoyed by the CIA and cold-war liberals in remaking
Abstract Expressionism into a mere celebratory signified of late capitalism along with
U.S. hegemony. This situation remains the case in spite of the way many mainstream art
historians, along with their adversaries among the social historians of art, unhesitatingly
speak for entire countries and even continents when they write of the New York School’s
global ‘triumph.’118
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Past art historical studies are not, however, rendered useless in Craven’s view: “The point
here is not so much that they [Cockcroft and affiliates] are wrong, but that their positions
are now too reductive (and dated) to permit further insights into the ongoing struggle over
the art’s signification and thus also into the unstable nature of Abstract
Expressionism.”119
Past art historical essays, such as Cockcroft’s, embody a pivotal step for Craven
to arrive at his analysis. Craven argues that revisionist art historians, however, have also
exhausted their influence. Craven describes Cockcroft’s and similar art historian’s
contributions:
In her well-known 1974 study…Eva Cockcroft outlined in groundbreaking fashion the
nexus of relationships involving former CIA operatives and some MOMA officials
whereby Abstract Expressionism, along with other U.S. artworks in many different
styles, was exhibited abroad as ‘representative’ of U.S. culture. Hence, it is in this
qualified sense that Serge Guilbaut [arguing in line with Cockcroft] was justified in his
claim that North American ‘Avant-garde radicalism did not really ‘sell out,’ it was
borrowed for the anti-Communist cause.120

Craven’s analysis is built on the foundation established by Cockcroft and revisionist art
historians. Their influence has been exhausted, along with other historians such as
Kimmelman, however, because of their focus on the affiliations between MoMA, critics,
and government agencies. They assume reactions and signification of Abstract
Expressionism for entire nations. Craven asserts his analysis is more accurate because he
goes outside this scope to explore local reactions to Abstract Expressionism beyond
Europe and the United States as well as his in-depth research into the affiliations and
sentiments among the artists.121 By including more perspectives Craven argues the artists
acted with more independence that previously perceived. The core of his argument,
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however, is focused on detailing how Abstract Expressionism was utilized as a
commodity:
Indeed, it was the paradoxical and quite unsettled context of the 1950s that, in addition to
cold-war hysteria, allowed people allied with the U.S. government and corporate capital
to attempt to use—often rather unsuccessfully—both modernist art and social realism as
signifiers of an existing state of ‘total freedom’ in the United States. This occurred when
people formerly of the CIA, in collusion with certain cold-war liberals of corporate
capital, mounted clandestine support for circulating exhibitions of artworks by dissident
figurative artists, such as Ben Shahn, on the one hand, and the Abstract Expressionists, on
the other. Revealingly, covert involvement by people associated with the CIA in funding
these exhibitions was necessary because of the overt government censorship of the arts
then rampant in the United States during the McCarthy years. 122

MoMA was a necessary surrogate for government utilization of Abstract Expressionism
in diplomacy. Only by commodifying the artwork could it be made to “represent” midcentury capitalist American culture. A more detailed analysis of Craven’s argument and
its implications for MoMA will take place in section 4.
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SEEKING AN INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE

In spite of assertions regarding MoMA’s utilization of Abstract Expressionism,
the artists never fully embraced the role placed on them. Critical success, riches, and
fame quickly came to original members of the New York School; especially its leading
members such as Pollock and Rothko. Despite their success, Pollock died in an
automobile accident due to alcohol, and Rothko committed suicide in his studio because,
according to his close friends, he could not “cope with the contradiction of being
showered with material rewards for works which ‘howled their opposition to burgeoi
[sic] materialism.’”123 Saunders asserts that no matter the extent to which Abstract
Expressionist art was utilized as a political tool it cannot be reduced to that. She argues
that “Abstract Expressionism, like jazz, was—is—a creative phenomenon existing
independently and even, yes, triumphantly, apart from the political use which was made
of it.”124 Saunders is one of the few art historians to consider the relationship of MoMA,
the federal government, and Abstract Expressionism from the perspective of the artists
and their artwork.
In contrast to past, or even current, understandings of Abstract Expressionism, it
was never completely successfully utilized as a diplomatic tool for the U.S. government.
Craven argues this from a previously neglected point of view. It was not due to the
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failings of MoMA or government officials, but the ability of Abstract Expressionist art
and artists to elude their agenda, labels, and dialectic. This dialectic is concisely captured
by Gibson when she characterizes the artists given choices as being between
“Communism and McCarthyism,”125 of which there was realistically only one choice.
Craven writes, “The New York School preferred the term ‘anti-Stalinist’ to define their
political beliefs. It allowed them, in essence, to be communist but not ‘Red’ communism,
this defied the accepted polarity of the period.”126 Abstract expressionism never signified
or embodied what diplomatically minded individuals assumed and presented it to be. It
was the equivalent of using a jackhammer to force a round peg into a square opening.
When Abstract Expressionism was presented as “American” art abroad, it was not
universally accepted as such. While it was made in the U.S., it cannot be accurately
equated with mid-century “Americaness.” Craven describes this situation: “This artwork
is a ‘national’ signifier abroad for a nation that has not generally embraced it and the
‘international’ signifier elsewhere for a principled opposition to the nation that originally
produced it.”127 One could argue then, that because anti-American art was produced in
the U.S., it does serve its purpose as a signifier of freedom. The Abstract Expressionists,
however, sought to protest the most basic assumptions of American society, including the
confines of the “freedom” it was being utilized to signify.
The Abstract Expressionists contested the utopian consumerist U.S. society.
Craven argues Abstract Expressionism was beyond the kind of protest ascribed to it by
agents of diplomacy. He writes: “the emphatic nature of this undertaking [Abstract
Expressionism] was not defined either as ‘escapism,’ ‘disengagement,’ ‘resignation,’ or
125
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‘evasion,’ but rather as an ethically unrepentant and even desublimated contestation of
the existing order.”128 The very nature of the “freedom” advertised by diplomatic officials
was criticized by the Abstract Expressionists. That “freedom” was predicated on the
individual’s right to choose, but those choices were only valid, according to American
consumer culture, when they are made within the American market. It is evident that
among the Abstract Expressionists there was a keen awareness of the failure of McCarthy
era politics in the U.S. Their sense of alienation was manifested in the 1960s when
members of the New York School “chose to support the civil rights movement, the
antiwar movement, and the call for dramatic structural change in the 1960s.”129
Those individuals characterized as Abstract Expressionists wanted to operate
independent of and criticize the consumerist structure imposed on American society.
Gibson argues in her book Abstract Expressionism: Other Politics that the Abstract
Expressionists were foremost dedicated to their artwork and repressing “anything that
threatened the autonomy of art.”130 Proponents of mid-century commodified society
attempted to soak up anything “produced” in the U.S. as a signifier of America’s
superiority. A fundamental tactic the Abstract Expressionists utilized to repress this was
the aesthetic emptiness of their paintings which eliminated any links with the
interpretation or distribution of the artwork.131 Willem de Kooning affirms this when he
argued that Abstract Expressionism “implies that every artist can do what he thinks he
ought to—a movement for each person and open for everybody…It is exactly in its
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uselessness that it is free.”132 This was not, however, a passive desire on the part of the
Abstract Expressionists to be independent of consumerist culture. Gibson writes: “What
they [Abstract Expressionists] consciously feared were those aspects of culture that
marked their work as things for sale and those that regarded art as a vehicle for
politics.”133 The artists characterized as being part of the Abstract Expressionist
movement not only feared how their art would be manipulated by the society they lived,
but specifically the assertive commodification MoMA applied to their artwork.
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COMMODIFYING ABSTRACT EXPRESSIONISM

The theory of Abstract Expressionism utilized for diplomacy was invented by
critics and individuals in the private sector. These actors not only framed Abstract
Expressionism as a product of American capitalism, but also promoted its proliferation.
Towards this end individuals in the media were pressured to promote Abstract
Expressionist artists.
Barr convinced Life magazine to feature Pollock, thereby introducing Abstract
Expressionism to the audiences outside New York. When Pollock was featured in the
August 1949 issue of Life it marked his, and Abstract Expressionism’s, definitive
establishment on the national scene. Life magazine’s publisher and editor, Henry Luce,
however, did not publish the story based solely on Pollock’s artistic merits. As the
Director of Museum Collections at MoMA in 1949, Barr wrote to Luce convincing him
not to criticize modern art as was being done in the Soviet Union. “Thus was Luce,”
writes Saunders, “who held the phrase ‘America’s intellectual health’ permanently on the
end of his tongue…won over to Barr’s and MoMA’s interests.”134 The August, 1949
issue of Life allowed Abstract Expressionism to enter homes across the country. It was
not, however, about artwork but rather a personal profile of Pollock. Such exposes helped
build the artist’s celebrity status, aiding in commodifying his artwork as manifestations of
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his fame. This not only played into MoMA’s agenda but also formed the basis for how
Kefauver would make critical selections from the art market for the AIEP.
Abstract Expressionism was exposed to new audiences through the media as well
as critical literature, but that exposure strategically neglected the artist’s critical beliefs.
Critics attempted to isolate Abstract Expressionism from the artist’s politics by focusing
on the artwork’s formal aspects. One of the most significant figures to mold a framework
for Abstract Expressionism was Clement Greenberg who stated: “These American
painters did not set out to be advanced. They set out to paint good pictures.”135 Greenberg
was the central figure among art critics who emphasized a purely formalist reading of
Abstract Expressionism. Formalism is defined by the Encyclopedia of Aesthetics as “the
aesthetic doctrine in which…related (formal) elements are said to be the primary locus of
aesthetic value, a value that is independent of such other characteristics of an artwork as
meaning, reference, or utility.”136 Craven states in his analysis that Abstract
Expressionism “was unjustifiably bowdlerized in ideological terms by one of its
‘defenders’ (i.e. Greenberg), who thereby cleared the way for a formalist dogma of
modernism that was narrow-mindedly presumed to follow.”137
Greenberg’s analysis reduced Abstract Expressionist paintings to “art for art’s
sake.” This theory ignored the diverse political agendas of Abstract Expressionist artists.
Greenberg, along with MoMA, propagated this conception of Abstract Expressionism
through:
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the institutionally mediated reception of these paintings, which increasingly encourages
the fetishistic view of them as the most costly human-made objects in the world, could
lead to the appropriation or evisceration of both the critical edge and aesthetic import of
this artwork by the very existing order these painters intended to criticize. 138

Through the exhibition then buying and selling of Abstract Expressionists’ artwork, their
paintings were relegated to commodities isolated from the artists’ politics rendering them
unopposed to 1950s capitalist America. Saunders asserts MoMA “held tenaciously to its
executive role in manufacturing a history for Abstract Expressionism”:
Ordered and systematic, this history reduced what had once been provocative and strange
to an academic formula, a received mannerism, an art official. Thus installed within the
canon, the freest form of art now lacked freedom. More and more painters produced more
and more paintings which got bigger and bigger and emptier and emptier. It was this very
stylistic conformity, prescribed by MoMA and the broader social contract of which it was
a part, that brought Abstract Expressionism to the verge of kitsch. ‘It was like the
emperor’s clothes,’ said Jason Epstein. ‘You parade it down the street and you say, “This
is great art,” and the people along the parade route will agree with you. Who’s going to
stand up to Clem[ent] Greenberg and later to the Rockefellers who were buying it for
their bank lobbies and say, “This stuff is terrible?”’139

By featuring Abstract Expressionism as the greatest artistic creations of American
democracy based on capitalism, MoMA ensured it would also be the most valuable. The
commodification of Abstract Expressionism was paralleled by rising financial incentives
to paint and competition in the market. By the end of the 1950s Pop art emerged,
critically engaging the art market commodifying Abstract Expressionism as well as
commodified society.
Throughout the 1950s, however, Abstract Expressionist artwork and artists
resisted commodification. Greenberg and MoMA failed to fully encapsulate Abstract
Expressionist painting as a commodity. “The paintings of Abstract Expressionism,”
writes Craven:
which arose partly as an assimilation of non-Western cultural traditions and as a
repudiation of commodity production in the United States—would indeed sometimes
become quite precious commodities exalting the American Way; yet they would also
138
139

Craven, Abstract Expressionism as Cultural Critique, 140.
Saunders, Cultural Cold War, 274.

50

remain many other, often contradictory, things as well, at least some of which rendered
this process of commodification fundamentally unstable and never entirely uncontested.
(It is of note here that formalist critics such as Clement Greenberg, ever concerned with
bowdlerizing this art and blunting its critical edge, would celebrate in 1960 how “The
Jackson Pollock Market Soars.”)140

Attempts to commoditize Abstract Expressionist art succeeded to an extent, but the
artwork was never fully isolated from its critical nature. The attempts to relegate Abstract
Expressionism to “art for art’s sake” failed because a purely formalist analysis of the
artwork ignores the nature of its creation. Robert Motherwell retorted to such efforts: “I
believe that the New York School, like Surrealism, is less an aesthetic style…than a state
of mind…And a mode of life.”141 This “mode of life”, however, was incompatible with
the utopian capitalist America represented in international diplomacy.
MoMA’s curatorial decisions during the 1950s reflect the agenda to repress nonformalist aspects of Abstract Expressionism. In 1953 MoMA organized an exhibition of
what it designated as the best American avant-garde art titled 12 Modern American
Painters and Sculptors.142 The exhibition was held at the Musée National d'Art Modern
and had tumultuous beginnings. MoMA claimed the request for the exhibition came from
the host institution to pre-emptively counter claims it was pushing American art on
France. This was, however, not true. A dispatch from the American Embassy in Paris
recounts how
In early February 1953, the Museum requested the Cultural Relations Section of the
Embassy to discuss with Jean Cassou, Director of the Musee National d’Art Moderne at
Paris, the possibility of putting on the present show. M. Cassou had already scheduled all
of his exhibition space until the spring of 1954. On learning, however, that this exhibition
would be available, he reorganized his plans and put off an exhibition of the Belgian
painter, Ensor, which had been planned.143
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The Embassy was unable “to take any action on this request because of the absence of
any art program under the auspices of the United States Government,” but that “in the
case of the exhibition of American art under consideration, however, the Nelson
Rockefeller Fund broke this deadlock, which allotted funds to the Museum of Modern
Art in New York to be used for international exhibitions.”144 Since the Embassy was
unable to officially support an exhibition of critical avant-garde art, it coordinated with
the Association Française d’Action Artistique to garner support. A donation from the
Association provided funds for a catalog, posters, and “all publicity for the show.”145
With official links to MoMA and the CIA it is evident the Association was not
simply acting in the name of art. The director of the Association, Phillipe Erlanger, had
organized support for the U.S. based Congress for Cultural Freedom and he was also a
designated CIA contact in the French Foreign Office. According to Saunders, “Through
him, the Congress for Cultural Freedom (and on this occasion, MoMA), acquired a
credible conduit for official French funds to cultural propaganda initiatives.”146 It was
through such covert dealings that MoMA and the Rockefellers devised exhibition
schedules of Abstract Expressionism.
The curatorial decisions of the exhibitions reveal a specific diplomatic agenda.
The diversity of artwork included in the exhibition is telling of what MoMA wanted the
artwork to signify. As Craven describes, there was an “attempt [emphasis added] to use—
often rather unsuccessfully—both modernist and social realism as signifiers of an
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existing state of ‘total freedom’ in the United States.”147 As Figure 1148 depicts, the
exhibition ranged in scope from John Kane to Pollock. As the title to the exhibition
demonstrates, the most fundamental theme is simply that the artwork was American.
MoMA disregards Abstract Expressionism’s desire to isolate itself from mid-century
capitalist America as well as social realism’s critique of that culture.
Analyzing Figure 1 also reveals further curatorial initiatives. At the far end of the
gallery is Pollock’s characteristic drip painting. While it is partially blocked by an
Alexander Calder mobile and sculpture, it is the climax at the end of the gallery and
would draw visitors to the final gallery as they ventured through. From Figure 1 and
Figure 2,149 one can ascertain the final gallery is also the largest. The Pollock, although
the largest, is given preferential wall space independent of any other works. There is clear
favoritism toward Abstract Expressionist works in this exhibition even though all the
artwork is presented as “American.”
In 1958 the International Council sponsored another exhibition of avant-garde
American art. The New American Painting150 was intended to be a “who’s who” among
Modern American artists with the press release declaring it is the “first comprehensive
exhibition to be sent to Europe of advanced tendencies in American painting.”151 MoMA
attempted to keep its diplomatic agenda covert by stating:
Although these artists have been associated with the movement generally called Abstract
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Figure 2. “Installation view of 12 Modern American Painters and Sculptors,” Musee
National d’Art Modern, Paris, 1953.
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Figure 3. “Rene d’Harnoncourt (right) at the press opening of ’12 Modern American
Painters and Sculptors,’” Musee National d’Art Modern, Paris, 1953.
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Expressionism, according to Alfred H. Barr, Jr,, Director of Museum Collections, who
has written the introduction for the exhibition catalog, they dislike labels and shun the
words “movement” and “school.” ‘None speaks for the others any more than he paints for
the others. Their individualism is uncompromising and as a matter of principle they do
nothing deliberately in their work to make ‘communication’ easy.’” 152

Claiming Abstract Expressionism is not a “movement” caters to MoMA’s
commodification of it. Barr argues the artists paint independently, negating suspicion of a
“movement” with an agenda. He also focuses on the formalist aspects of the paintings,
which do not “make ‘communication’ easy,” further isolating them from politics.
Claiming there was no collaboration between artists was also inaccurate. The term
“School of New York” was coined by Motherwell in 1949153 to describe the growing
movement and the publication Dissent demonstrates just one example of collaborative
efforts.
When Barr apathetically argues how grouping these artists as “Abstract
Expressionists” is inappropriate, he furtively directs attention to Abstract Expressionism.
This falsely apathetic approach to Abstract Expressionism is further asserted in the press
release which states the exhibition was organized “in response to numerous requests by
the Museum’s International Program” motivated to “organize [the exhibition] in response
to repeated requests from institutions in Europe.”154 Barr also maintains a formalist
analysis by stating: “The paintings themselves have a sensuous, emotional, esthetic and at
times mystical power which works and can be overwhelming.”155 The combination of
diffusing Abstract Expressionism and employing formalist analysis to remove the
paintings’ critical edge rendered the artwork as an inimitable diplomatic tool.
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THE AIEP: CURATING COMMODITIES

While the roots of the AIEP are in MoMA’s International Council and
International Program, the election of President Kennedy in 1960 was necessary to make
it a federal program. During his campaign Kennedy outlined his ideas for the relationship
between the government and the arts. In a campaign speech delivered in 1960, Kennedy
said, “There is a connection, hard to explain logically but easy to feel, between
achievement in public life and progress in the arts”:
The age of Pericles was also the age of Phidias. The age of Lorenzo de Medici was also
the age of Leonardo da Vinci. The age of Elizabeth also the age of Shakespeare. And the
New Frontier for which I campaign in public life, can also be a New Frontier for
American Art.
For what I descry is a lift for our country; a surge of economic growth; a burst of
activity in rebuilding and cleansing our cities; a breakthrough of the barriers of racial and
religious discrimination; an Age of Discovery in science and space; and an openness
toward what is new that will banish the suspicion and misgiving that have tarnished our
prestige abroad. I forsee[sic], in short, an America that is moving once again.
And in harmony with that creative bust, there is bound to come the New Frontier
in the Arts. For we stand, I believe, on the verge of a period of sustained cultural
brilliance. 156

Kennedy equates economic growth with artistic creativity and asserts a paternalistic
relationship of the former over the latter. According to Kennedy, Pericles and Lorenzo de
Medici, for example, created societies which allowed and fostered the flourishing of the
arts. Kennedy recognized and accepted the theory put forth by Barr that American art was
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a product of American capitalism. Diplomatic activities involving the arts, therefore,
were attractive to his administration.
In 1963 President Kennedy appointed August Heckscher to conduct a study on the
federal government and the arts. The report submitted to President Kennedy on May 28,
1963 discusses a vast range of arts activities with one section devoted to placing
American artwork in embassies abroad. Heckscher details the necessity of an art in
embassies program and says of the artwork: “these works should not be considered
‘interior decoration,’ but as art representing the finest of American creative
expression.” 157 Heckscher reaffirms the notion of linking patriotism and artistic
achievement. While subtle, this notion is representative of official opinion and pervaded
the AIEP.
The AIEP’s stated purpose and criteria for artwork reflect an assumed
“Americaness” for artwork produced in the United States. The AIEP outlines its activities
and states: “The Art in the Embassies Program is a service of the Department of State, the
purpose being to provide art appropriate for the representational rooms of Ambassador’s
Residences and Chanceries.” 158 This is the closest definition of a mission statement to be
found for the AIEP and does not demonstrate a commitment to the artwork.
“Appropriate” art that is “representational” of the United States defines the filter through
which artwork will be presented to foreign audiences. 159 The criteria laid out by the AIEP
reaffirm this agenda:
We believe that:
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1. Works of art must be original.
2. All must be of recognized quality to best represent American culture.
3. Important factors in planning a collection are the cultural concepts and art trends of the
country in which the works are to be placed.
4. For Embassy Residence, preference of the Ambassador and his wife should be
considered and related to established criteria.
5. To insure conservation of the art, climatic conditions must be taken into account. 160

Abstract Expressionism and Pop art did not “best represent American culture.” Rather,
mid-century American avant-garde artwork was made appropriate through
commodification.
The AIEP misrepresented Abstract Expressionist and Pop art work by showcasing
them as commodities in its exhibitions. Catalogs produced in conjunction with AIEP
exhibition reveal how the artwork was misrepresented. The majority of catalogs produced
for AIEP exhibitions in the 1960s had universal introductory essays. On occasion, a brief
section or additional paragraph would explain something of the artwork or artists, but
rarely, if ever, place them in a critical theory. The catalog produced for the exhibition Art
in Embassies on Display at the American Embassy Club states: “The program is designed to

further the appreciation of American creative ability abroad by providing U.S. embassies
throughout the world with good original art reflecting current and traditional North
American culture in an effective manner.” 161 The catalog also states that “All artworks
displayed are originals and all are of recognized quality to best represent American
culture.” 162
Artwork was selected and filtered to best represent an idealized American culture,
not to demonstrate the best representations of American culture. The focus of AIEP
exhibitions was not to highlight significant examples of United States culture, but to
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display the vitality of a utopian capitalist vision of America. In this particular catalog
there are seven paragraphs explaining the AIEP and its significance for the federal
government, and one paragraph pertaining to the artwork itself. It states: “from the
collection which the American Embassy in Bonn has received in the framework of this
program 22 works are being shown here. They include original prints of living American
artists, representing all trends. Modern realism and abstract expressionism are included as
are OP and POP art.” 163 This is reminiscent of MoMA’s 1953 exhibition 12 American
Painters and Sculptors where social realism and Abstract Expressionism were
unsuccessfully exhibited together simply as American works of art. 164 The AIEP makes
no effort to differentiate Abstract Expressionism and Pop art, their significance lies in
their “Americaness.” This is typical for catalogs produced by the AIEP during the 1960s.
A litany of the styles included or how the collection came into existence form the
standard content. “In-depth” discussion of the artwork and its theoretical basis is
practically non-existent. This statement, like most, is a rather feeble attempt to place the
artwork in a context. Devotion is paid to the AIEP and the “Americaness” of the artwork
rather than the artistic contributions of the art or artists.
The statement “to best represent American culture” was exceptionally
problematic when considered in this context. Given the selection of artwork included in
exhibitions, if the AIEP had made a conscious recognition of the volatility and ever
present change in the U.S. during the 1960s their exhibitions could have verged on
brilliant. There was no recognition of this, however, and exhibitions were only
conglomerations of what the AIEP perceived as popular in the art market. This is
163
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demonstrative of how the AIEP’s curatorial decisions were a direct extension of MoMA’s
promulgation of Abstract Expressionism abroad. MoMA exhibited Abstract
Expressionism as the best artistic commodity being produced in the U.S. The AIEP
continued this practice by selecting popular artwork from the market and making no
attempt to maintain its context. The only context reflected in curatorial decisions was the
artworks being produced in America and sold in its leading commercial galleries and
collected by its major museums.
The leadership of the AIEP demonstrated awareness of the vitality and diversity
of mid-century American avant-garde art but failed to understand and incorporate its
tenants into exhibitions. “To the connoisseurs, abstract represents the artists thinking”
stated Kefauver, “It represents the turmoil of these times… Representational art is found
in pop art…which is very documentary, and in both comic strips and advertising
art…This art typifies our way of life [emphasis added].” 165 Kefauver was aware of the art
market’s diversity, but she was reluctant to classify the artwork beyond being American.
This statement is likely referring to three Pop artists that appeared in AIEP exhibitions:
Roy Lichtenstein, Andy Warhol, and Robert Rauschenberg. Kefauver was likely
referencing Warhol and Rauschenberg when she spoke of “advertising art,” further
evidenced by their inclusion in a number of AIEP exhibitions in the mid-1960s. It is a
near certainty she was referencing Lichtenstein when she spoke of “comic strip” art.
While their artwork utilized representational signifiers of American culture, it was
certainly not in a manner that “typifies” the culture.

165

The State, Columbia, South Carolina, 5 July 1965, from clippings file of Carol Harford, quoted in Carla
M. Hanzal, “The Fusion of Art and Politics: Events Shaping the Public-Private Venture to take American
Art Abroad” (master’s thesis, American University, 1990), 135.

61

Warhol’s artwork was proclaimed to represent America around the world. A
Newsweek expose states: “Andy Warhol’s ‘Flowers’ bloom on walls in American
chanceries in Nepal, Bern, and the American Embassy in Madrid.” 166 The New York
Times also heralded that “When Ambassador and Mrs. Angier Biddle Duke took up their
new post recently in Madrid, they adorned the walls of their embassy residence with a
painting by Andy Warhol, the pop artist.” 167 In both instances the AIEP provided the
artwork. These statements did not come from the AIEP but they were no doubt endorsed.
Once again, the AIEP had arbitrarily drawn a parallel between an American artist and
“Americaness.” Warhol, however, was not celebrating signifiers of American life in his
work. Thomas Crow states that “To understand Pop in the early 1960s as a new realism
or a return to figuration meant accepting a devalued status for the human body”:
which had traditionally been the central concern and focus of figurative art. The
restoration of reference to the world, offered in a defiance of the long march of advanced
art toward abstraction, entailed granting manufactured products equal or superior status to
the human beings who purchased and used them; Andy Warhol offered, albeit with a
certain poignancy, the human figure already transformed into inert products. 168

Warhol, and Pop art, did not “typify” American life in the celebratory fashion Kefauver
asserted. He lamented the effects of commodification on society. “Warhol came to
produce his most powerful paintings,” writes Crow, “by dramatizing the hollowness of
the consumer icon.” 169 Warhol’s Flowers series did not embody his typically searing
criticism of consumer culture 170 and represents a tactful curatorial selection made by
Kefauver, remaining dedicated to choosing artwork “to best represent American culture.”
Warhol was “attracted to the open sores in American political life. The issues that were
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most problematic for liberal Democratic politicians such as John and Robert
Kennedy.” 171 Kefauver was astute enough to recognize Warhol as a pivotal Pop artist and
utilized his fame and artwork to “typify” American culture, but did not select artwork that
captured the essence of his style and aims.
Following his capture of the grand prize at the Venice Biennale in 1964,
Rauschenberg provided Kefauver appropriate fame to capitalize on. As the first American
to win the grand prize since Whistler, Rauschenberg instantly assumed celebrity status.
An AIEP catalog proclaims of Rauschenberg’s accomplishments: “Today one of the most
famous of American artists; winner of the Venice Biennale (1964). Several qualities
which distinguish his work—use of rags, rope, fans, and other items casually attached to
his canvasses—have made him a leader in this avant-garde style.” 172 His status as an icon
in the art world made his art desirable to the AIEP, but they could not see past his
artwork as more than “American.” Throughout his oeuvre Rauschenberg grapples with a
host of issues, but one that would be particularly problematic for the AIEP were his
inclusion of homosexual signifiers in his artwork. In his mixed media assemblage
Canyon, 1959, Rauschenberg “melded patriotic and homoerotic emblems, exploiting the
possibilities of immediate visual transcription offered by photographic silkscreen
printing.” 173 Rauschenberg challenged one of the foundational values of the U.S. Cold
War utopian culture, the roles of breadwinner and homemaker, through homoerotic
implications in his art and the relationship with his lover and artistic collaborator Jasper
Johns. In an era when a monolithic, countrywide effort was needed to push the Civil
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Rights Act of 1964 through to legislation to give rights to minorities and women, gay
rights and advocacy were certainly not part of the national identity and are still excluded
to this day. Asserting such alternative lifestyles should have disqualified Rauschenberg’s
artwork from “typifying” U.S. culture, but the “Americaness” of his artwork remained,
for Kefauver, its most pertinent aspect.
Like Rauschenberg and Warhol, Lichtenstein used representative signifiers of
American culture in his artwork, but not in a celebratory manner as asserted by Kefauver.
The curatorial decision to include his artwork is yet another example of art chosen for
popularity, but removed from context. Lichtenstein did not target volatile political issues,
but established himself in the realm of fine arts. Within this context Lichtenstein utilized
his artwork to explore and dissect the content and medium of popular culture. What he
discovered was that organic encounters with the world were readily being reshaped and
defined by the imagery of mass culture. 174 Like Warhol, Lichtenstein sought to
demonstrate the hollow and disingenuous nature of the consumer icon. His trademark
style of meticulously recreating comic book imagery can make it appear deceptively
celebratory of American culture. It is not, however, a celebration or an attempt to connote
American life in the sense Kefauver stated, but to critically evaluate it, even undermine
its power.
Kefauver made similar curatorial decisions in selecting early twentieth century
American art. In the early twentieth century an American style of art appeared which
utilized urban realism to depict the seedy aspects of American life such as prostitutes,
beggars, and scenes of poverty. This style and group of artists were dubbed the “Ashcan
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School.” In making its selections for artwork, the AIEP tended to “screen out the more
abrasive commentaries on shabby aspects of the American scene, such as some works of
the Ashcan School.” 175 In the early 1960s Ambassador William Benton 176 planned to
donate paintings by artist Reginald Marsh (1898-1954). Marsh painted scenes in the
tradition of the Ashcan School, depicting urban life and its more sordid aspects. 177
Benton was, however, aware enough to present the AIEP with street and harbor scenes
rather than Marsh’s notable paintings depicting the bowery and burlesque shows 178 in
New York City.
Four of the paintings Benton donated appeared in an AIEP exhibition at the
Embassy in Copenhagen in 1967. Reginald Marsh’s paintings Christmas Shoppers (1),
year unknown, Christmas Shoppers (2), year unknown, New York Sky-line with Tug in
Foreground, year unknown, and Ferry-Boat Docked in River, year unknown, were
exhibited along with a biography of the artist. The catalog states: “Fascinated by the life
of New York, he has concentrated mainly on portraying character in people, places and
things. His mastery of the body was based on constant observation and drawing, and on
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thorough study of anatomy.” 179 The catalog tactfully evades mentioning what Marsh is
best known for while still paying tribute to his legacy.
Ad Reinhardt’s artistic achievements are equally avoided. The exhibition at the
Embassy in Copenhagen was held the same year as Reinhardt’s death, 1967, by which
time he had attracted substantial attention from the federal government for his political
beliefs. A 123 page FBI file, of which only 100 pages is public, was compiled from 1941
to 1966 which followed Reinhardt’s “subversive” activities. He was an avowed socialist
and his file was marked “SM-C” or “Security Matter-C” which means: “According to the
FBI, along with other government agencies, the subject constitutes a national security
threat and is a subversive because his or her sympathies for communism and/or socialism
make him or her a ‘potential’ collaborator with foreign agents.” 180 The contributors to
this file are as enlightening as its content. Reinhardt’s file contains was compiled by the
FBI but incorporate substantial information from the State Department, foreign embassies
of the United States, the U.S. Navy, and the Counter-Intelligence Branch of the U.S.
Marine Corps. 181 Considering that the Department Kefauver worked for contributed to
the file on Reinhardt’s “subversive” activities, it is unfathomable that she was not aware
of the attention being paid to him.
In spite of this Reinhardt was still included in the exhibition. The biographical
catalog entry on him, however, reveals reluctance to expound his character. If the reader
of the catalog entry on him knew nothing of Reinhardt, the only generalization they could
draw is that he is American and deeply interwove in the art community in the U.S. The
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entry on him merely includes his education, select exhibition locations, and select
publications and journal entries. 182 Nearly all other biographical entries, including
Reginald Marsh, expel personal information. The only relevant information about
Reinhardt is that he is extensively shown and published establishing his significance.
His artistic aims and roots in the New York School and Abstract Expressionism
are secondary to the fact he is American. Reinhardt’s Black Series No. 5, year unknown,
was his sole work in the exhibition and was part of his final development as an Abstract
Expressionist. This artwork emerged from Reinhardt’s arrival in 1962 at what he
designated “the final, ethically and logically impeccable form of painting,”:
A Square (neutral, shapeless) canvas, five feet wide, five feet
high…(not large, not small, sizeless), trisected (no composition), one
horizontal form negating one vertical form (formless, no top, no
bottom, directionless), three (more or less) dark (lightless) nocontrasting (colorless) colors, brushwork brushed out to remove
brushwork, a matte, flat, free-hand painted surface (glossless,
textureless, non-linear, no hard edge, no soft edge). 183

A viewer must spend prolonged amounts of time in front of such a canvas before the
surface reveals any differentiated detail. Thomas Crow writes how Reinhardt arrived at
this because “he refused to subordinate his painting to any sort of instrumental
commitment, least of all social commentary. Instead, only the most extreme refusal of
art’s normal blandishments were for him a sufficient moral response to the plight of the
artist in a society ruled by capital.” 184 Reinhardt was seeking through his artwork a
complete isolation from commodification.
Black Series No. 5 is intrinsically antithetical to the American capitalist culture
meant to be displayed in the exhibition. The curatorial choices for displaying the artwork
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reflect either a willfully negligent attitude toward Reinhardt and his artwork or a
complete lack of understanding of his artistic aims. Black Series No. 5 was exhibited in
what one can only describe the “miscellaneous” gallery at the Embassy in Copenhagen.
According to the catalog, it was in a nondescript gallery, perhaps a hallway or foyer, on
the second floor. Within that space was a selection of paintings not related by style or
time period, but simply by being American. Black Series No. 5 was displayed alongside
works by Sister Mary Corita, Reginald Marsh 185, Evelyn Metzger, and David W. Stearns
as well as photographs by Wynn Bullock and Cole Weston. Of the individual galleries in
this exhibition, this gallery exhibits the least cohesion or context amongst the artwork. 186
Reinhardt’s Black Series No. 5 (Figure 3) has little in common with, for example, scenes
of Christmas shoppers depicted by Marsh (Figure 4) or the vibrantly colored, childlike
figures of Sister Mary Corita 187 (Figure 5). These artists not only differ aesthetically, but
do not belong to the same style or time period.
The AIEP actively avoided making such contextual distinctions in its curatorial
practice. In a memo detailing a meeting with Leonard Carmichael, Secretary of the
Smithsonian Institution, Robert H. Thayer states:
He warned of the tremendous difficulties involved in getting into the field of
contemporary American art due to the great controversy in that field and the extreme
views of many of the most important people knowledgeable on the subject. He pointed
out that people interested in American contemporary art seemed to look down their noses
at anything else and he felt that the difficulties of getting a selection committee who
would be sane on the topic of both eighteenth and nineteenth early American art and
contemporary art would be almost insurmountable. 188
185
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Figure 4. Ad Reinhardt, Abstract Painting No. 5, 1962, oil on canvas, Collection of the
Tate Britain Museum. This is not the painting that was shown in Copenhagen but is
characteristic of the style which Black Series No. 5 was created in.

69

Figure 5. Reginald Marsh, Christmas Shoppers #2, undated, ink on paper, Gift of William
Benton to the Art in Embassies Program.
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Figure 6. Sister Mary Corita Kent, For Eleanor, 1964, screen print, 29 5/8” x 39”,
Harvard Art Museum. This is not the painting that was exhibited in Copenhagen. It is
characteristic of the artist’s playful style and inclusion of text in the imagery.
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This was a common sentiment Thayer found during his preliminary study for the AIEP,
that a curator or curatorial committee was likely to be unable to appropriately select
traditional and contemporary works of art. The twenty person selection committee
formed to find appropriate artwork incorporated a diverse number of individuals with
vast expertise to inform the selection process. 189 Ultimately, however, “The program
attempted to reflect American democracy, steering clear of the art world’s internal
politics and snobberies,” 190 states Andrew Solomon writing on behalf of the AIEP. To
“reflect democracy” and avoid “snobberies” is to exhibit American art simply for being
made in the U.S., not for what it truly aims to signify (or not signify). This is a nearly
official affirmation of the AIEP depoliticizing mid-century American avant-garde to
render it appropriate for diplomacy.
Regardless of how it would be utilized, there was initiative to utilize avant-garde
art from the earliest planning phase of the AIEP. In a correspondence from Thayer to
Philip H. Coombs, Assistant Secretary of State for Education and Culture, he highlights
the importance as well as the inherent risk of utilizing avant-garde art:
It is of course true that any contemporary art is bound to arouse controversy and there
will be individuals who feel that they can make political capital by starting and
dramatizing such a controversy. However, it seems to me that the Department could
fortify itself against such events by choosing an outstanding group of individuals to pass
upon these paintings before they are accepted.
There is plenty of good contemporary American art which would be difficult for anyone
to attack. The United States today is unquestionably the center of contemporary art in the
world and all young artists are looking to us for leadership in this field. I believe very
strongly that this fact should be capitalized upon and that we should give the people of
other lands an opportunity to see this example of American culture in our Embassies
abroad. 191
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See Appendix 4.
Solomon, “The Art in Embassies Program,” 9.
191
Robert H. Thayer to Philip H. Coombs, “Contemporary American Paintings for American Embassies,”
April 20, 1961, Robert Helyer Thayer Papers, 1920-1980, MSS76877, The Library of Congress,
Washington D.C.
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Thayer demonstrates an awareness of the contemporary art market in the early 1960s and
one of the few references to artists’ stake in the matter, although it is of an exploitive
nature. Statements made in other correspondence demonstrate Thayer was not interested
in the artwork itself but only its “Americaness” when he decried “our embassies are
woefully lacking in Americana” and:
The President and Mrs. Kennedy have taken steps to bring the finest examples of
American art into the White House. Since a Chief of Mission is the personal
representative of the President abroad, it would seem most fitting that the same
philosophy be applied to our embassies and that a concentrated attempt be made to have
them truly represent the best in American culture. 192

These words were included in several correspondences to professionals in the art world
asking for their opinion on an art in embassies program. The earliest initiatives of the
AIEP were not focused on an appropriate exploration of avant-garde art, only an analysis
of how best to utilize the newest American art. This sentiment pervaded into the AIEP
when in a letter dated June 14, 1964 from Kefauver to Thayer she wrote “it is important
that U.S. Embassies reflect various facets of current and traditional representative
[emphasis added] North American art.” 193
There was little or no curatorial considerations for context because there was a
predetermined focus for every exhibition—American art. This focus was not just art
made in the U.S. or reflective of American culture, but art of American culture. It is clear
not all the contemporary artwork selected represented this agenda. The artwork instead
was forced into a new and different context from its original artistic intent. Conversely,
the AIEP would have failed to serve its purpose had it not included Warhol, Reinhardt,
Rauschenberg, and others as they were part of the vast art scene in the U.S. in the 1960s.
192

Robert Thayer to Dr. Richard Fuller, Director Seattle Art Museum, June 28, 1961, Robert Helyer Thayer
Papers, 1920-1980, MSS76877, The Library of Congress, Washington D.C.
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Nancy Kefauver to Robert H. Thayer, September 14, 1964, Robert Helyer Thayer Papers, 1920-1980,
MSS76877, The Library of Congress, Washington D.C.
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Such artists, however, were not utilized simply as another piece of the puzzle of
representative American art. They were paraded in articles and interviews as the best of
American art. The London Evening Star proclaimed “there is now a painting by ‘pop’
artist Andy Warhol on the walls of the United States Embassy in Madrid, and a black-onblack ‘op’ canvas by Ad Reinhardt in the residence of Ambassador Chester Bowles in
New Delhi.” 194 The article continues:
Now, under the direction of Nancy Kefauver, appointed to advise the State Department
(and they needed some advice) on the fine arts, hundreds of modern American paintings
are being sent out to United States embassies abroad to replace the familiar colour
reproductions of George Washington and General Eisenhower. 195

A front page New York Times article proclaimed “When Ambassador and Mrs. Angier
Biddle Duke took up their new post recently in Madrid, they adorned the walls of their
embassy residence with a painting by Andy Warhol, the pop artist, plus works by other
American contemporaries, including Josef Albers, Karl Zerbe, Larry Rivers and
Alexander Calder.” 196 The article also states:
Thousands of Soviet citizens calling at Spaso House, the Moscow residence of
Ambassador Foy D. Kohler, to see works by such artists George Bellows, Jasper Johns,
and Willem de Kooning. An Ad Reinhardt black-on-black ‘op’ painting, in company with
canvases by Stuart Davis, Ralston Crawford and Edward Hopper, jangles visitors to the
residence of American Ambassador Chester Bowles in New Delhi. 197

Of these efforts Kefauver said “by giving concrete evidence of what’s doing in U.S. art,
the program is strengthening our cultural image.” 198 There is a lack of individual
artworks by these prominent artists cited in the article. This is reflective of the AIEP
which utilized the artists fame in the same manner, equatable to “name dropping.” While
194
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these are not official State Department statements, they were no doubt endorsed and the
information had to have been released.
The New York Times article allows insight into curatorial choices pertaining to
exhibition techniques. Images accompanying the article provide rare glimpses of artwork
on display in embassies. Figure 6 199 depicts the Ambassador’s wife at Spaso House
showing guests a Rauschenberg lithograph. One would not expect a “white cube”
environment in a diplomatic residence but this lithograph is thoughtlessly positioned. It
hangs far too high above eye level and over a radiator. This is not only a poor physical
environment for a work on paper but does not provide an appropriate visual field for the
viewer. There is also an end table with a portrait and other objects under the lithograph
rendering it as an object amongst a group. This ignores the artwork’s independent
characteristics and does not offer the viewer an appropriate opportunity to engage with
the artwork. The same phenomenon takes place with another artwork pictured in the
article. Figure 7 200 shows Robert Goodnough’s 2R ‘64, year unknown, on exhibition in
the Embassy office in London. Like Rauschenberg’s lithograph at Spaso, Goodnough’s
painting is placed among other objects rendering it as part of a group. A bust of Abraham
Lincoln by August Saint-Gaudens is on display in front of the painting, actually
inhibiting a viewer from seeing all of it. This is not only disruptive, but a manifestation of
the AIEP’s exhibiting American artwork for its “Americaness.” The American roots of
the artwork are highlighted by placing them in such close proximity. This is exacerbated
with the inclusion of the likeness of a prominent American such as President Lincoln. It
is also a further instance of the AIEP presenting a conglomeration of American art with
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Featured in Grace Glueck, “Home Grown Art blooms in U.S. Missions,” New York Times July 6, 1965.
Featured in Grace Glueck, “Home Grown Art blooms in U.S. Missions,” New York Times July 6, 1965.
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no deeper context. Figure 8 201 demonstrates a similar effect on Grace Hartigan’s Essex
Market, 1956. While not as blatant as the effect on 2R ’64, Essex Market is shown in the
New Delhi embassy hanging over furniture of a previous era and an elegant coffee or tea
service on the table. This setting does not emphasize links between the objects as strongly
as the London Embassy office, but there remains a connotation that the painting is part of
a group, one consisting of American objects. The perspective of the images in Figures 7
and 8 pervades the sense that the paintings and other objects in the room share an
inherent American context. It is as if the photographer was aware (a distinct possibility)
of the mission of the AIEP to exhibit art for its “Americaness.”

201

Featured in Grace Glueck, “Home Grown Art blooms in U.S. Missions,” New York Times July 6, 1965.
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Figure 7. “Mrs. Foy D. Kohler, right, shows guests a lithograph, ‘Urban,’ by Robert
Rauschenberg at Spaso House, the Ambassador’s Moscow residence.”
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Figure 8. “‘2R ’64’, an abstract by Robert Goodnough, and a bust of Lincoln by SaintGaudens in office of embassy in London.”
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Figure 9. “‘Essex Market,’ by Grace Hartigan, is one of the paintings in dining room of
the Chester Bowles home in New Delhi.”
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CONCLUSION

The AIEP embraced the curatorial practices established by MoMA for midcentury American avant-garde artwork. MoMA’s curatorial practice focused on
commodifying Abstract Expressionism in order to make it a powerful international
diplomatic tool. Perceived as a commodity, Abstract Expressionist paintings were forced
into the canon of American products made to represent the historical triumph of
American capitalist society in the 1950s and 1960s. The AIEP naively continued this
practice and applied it to Pop art, ignoring both styles’ anti-capitalist goals as well as
their intellectually varied artistic aims in opposing capitalist society.
The AIEP maintained MoMA’s pro-capitalist theories through its selection
process, exhibition of artwork, and interpretive practices for the artwork. Exhibitions
produced by the AIEP implied that Abstract Expressionism and Pop art were logical
outcomes of a capitalist society, but did little to clarify the controversies raging within
American culture that these styles addressed. Nancy Kefauver selected artwork by the
leading American avant-garde artists, but failed to maintain the artist’s and artwork’s
context beyond being made in the U.S. By purposefully selecting popular artwork, then
neglecting its roots through manifold curatorial decisions, the AIEP presented
incompatible and at times opposing artwork within the same exhibitions to an
international audience as representative of American culture. Under Nancy Kefauver the
80

AIEP abdicated its responsibilities to clearly and thoroughly depict American culture
through its exhibitions, alternatively, depicting the U.S. and avant-garde art created
within its borders as a congruous consumerist paradise.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1
Artists included in MoMA’s 1953 exhibition 12 Modern American Painters and
Sculptors shown in Oslo, Helsinki, Stockholm, Dusseldorf, Paris, and Zurich (April,
1953-March, 1954):
1. Ivan Albright
2. Alexander Calder
3. Stuart Davis
4. Arshile Gorky
5. Morris Graves
6. Edward Hopper
7. John Kane
8. John Marin
9. Jackson Pollock
10. Theodore Roszak
11. Ben Shahn
12. David Smith

APPENDIX 2
Initial members of the MoMA’s International Council and their city of residence and
known affiliations.

1.
2.
3.
4.

International Council Members
Mrs. Gilbert W. Chapman, New York, donated artwork to MoMA’s collection
and established the Mrs. Gilbert W. Chapman for purchasing artwork.
Mr. Ralph F. Colin, New York, prominent art collector with large collection of
prints, paintings, and sculpture.
Mr. John de Menil, Houston, philanthropist, collector, and modern art advocate.
Mr. Leonard C. Hanna, Jr., Cleveland: Oil, iron, shipping maganate and
philanthropist. Served on advisory council of Cleveland Museum of Art19141920, board of trustees 1920-1957 (year of death), and left a bequest of over $33
million to the Museum.
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5. Mrs. Walter Hochschild, New York, along with her husband, donated artwork and
financial support to MoMA.
6. Mrs. Gertrud A. Mellon, Greenwich, collector and philanthropist, donated artwork
to MoMA and established the Mrs. Gertrud A. Mellon fund at the Metropolitan
Museum of Art, New York.
7. Mrs. Richard Rodgers, New York, wife of composer Richard Rodgers.
8. Mrs. John Rood, Minneapolis
9. Mrs. Henry Potter Russell, San Francisco, member of U.S. National Committee
for UNESCO.
10. Mrs. Victor Zurcher, Chicago, active in modern arts advocacy in Chicago and
supported artists such as Robert Motherwell.
Vice-Chairmen also members of the Museum Board
11. Mr. Wallace K. Harrison, architect and held close personal relationship with
Nelson Rockefeller, which likely lead to many of his commissions.
12. Mr. James Thrall Soby, critic, author, collector, and patron of the arts, he had
been involved with MoMA selection committees since 1940.
13. Mrs. Samuel A. Marx.
14. Mrs. Bliss Parkinson.
15. Mrs. John D. Rockefeller 3rd – Chairman, wife of John D. Rockefeller 3rd, son of
Abby Aldrich Rockefeller.

APPENDIX 3
Artists included in MoMA’s 1958 exhibition The New American Painting shown in
Basel, Milan, Madrid, Berlin, Amsterdam, Brussels, Paris, London, and New York
(April, 1958-March, 1959):
1. William Baziotes
2. James Brooks
3. Sam Francis
4. Arshile Gorky
5. Adolph Gottlieb
6. Philip Guston
7. Grace Hartigan
8. Franz Kline
9. Willem de Kooning
10. Robert Motherwell
11. Barnett Newman
12. Jackson Pollock
13. Mark Rothko
14. Theodoros Stamos
15. Clyfford Still
16. Bradley Walker Tomlin
17. Jack Tworkov
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APPENDIX 4
Initial Executive Committee and Accessions Committee members for the AIEP at their
establishment in 1965.
Executive Committee
1. Nancy Kefauver
2. David Scott, Director, National Collection of Fine Arts, Washington D.C.
3. Lloyd Goodrich, Director, Whitney Museum of American Art, New York.
Accessions Committee
1. Perry Rathbone, Museum of Fine Arts, Boston
2. Sue S. Thurman, Institute of Contemporary Arts, Boston
3. Bartlett H. Hayes, Addison Gallery of American Art, Andover, MA
4. Richard Collins, director of arts and sciences, IBM
5. Robert H. Thayer, former assistant to Secretary of State Dulles
6. Janet Ruben, Obelisk Gallery, Washington, D.C.
7. Roy Moyer, American Federation of Arts, New York
8. Katherine Kuh, art editor of Saturday Review, New York
9. Edward Rust, Academy of Art, Tennessee
10. Gudmund Vigtel, High Museum of Art, Atlant
11. Rexford Stead, Museum of Fine arts, St. Petersburg, Florida
12. Otto Wittman, Toledo Museum of Art, Toledo, Ohio
13. Norman de Haan, architect, Chicago
14. Laurence Sickman, Nelson Gallery of Art, Kansas City, Missourri
15. Eugene Kingman, Joslyn Art Museum, Omaha, Nebraska
16. Donald Goodall, University of Texas art Department, Austin
17. Dorothy Dunn, honorary associate in Indian arts, Los Altos, California
18. Richard Brown, Los Angeles County Museum, Los Angeles
19. Paul Mills, Oakland Art Museum, Oakland
20. Thomas Leavitt, Santa Barbara Museum of Fine Arts, Santa Barbara
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